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ABSTRACT 
CrNptographic primiti%cs Corm the Fundamental building blocks fir cryptographic 
applications and protocols and one of the oldest cr\ptographic primitive is 
S mmctric-kc\ crvptcograph\. in which an identical kc\ is used for both encryption 
and decr\ption of'contidcntial data. i.e. ti,. 	K,, K. where ce and (l ure encryption and 
deer ption algorithms respectively and K is the shared kc\ . On the basis of high level 
structure in \0hich the encrypt data. symmetric-kc} cr}ptography is hroadl\ 
classiticd as block ciphers and stream ciphers. 
A stream cipher pro\ ides a method tier obtaining contidcntialit\ of data: only the part\ 
ith know ledge of the secret key can obtain the content. 'I he research in this thesis is 
it contribution to the on-going research on the analysis and design cat stream ciphers 
Se eral dii.rent existing stream cipher, are analkscd and a nc%% stream cipher called 
"ROKI1.1it1 stream Cipher- is presented. 
I his thesis begins 	ith an introduction to theoretical fi~undations of modern day 
cr\ptograph\. fi►Ilo cd h\ a discussion on cryptographic primitives. Since this thesis 
is devoted to stream ciphers. the s mmctric key cr}ptography is anal\scd in detail and 
a stud\ on various modes of operation in \\hich sNmmctric key ciphers operate is 
presented. I o%%ards the end of chapter. it discussion is carried out on cr\ ptanal'.tic 
attacks on cryptographic protocols with the thrust being upon the attacks related to 
stream ciphers. 
Next. the ver\ concept of stream cipher and different design approaches of stream 
I 
	
	 cipher development are discussed. Linear Feedback shill registers (I.I SR) as maximal 
length sequence generators are widel4 used in stream ciphers t'r key stream 
Lcncratiun due to their good statistical properties. large period. loss implementation 
costs and are rcadil\ analysed using algebraic techniques. I.I SRs alone are 
notoriousl\ insecure from a cr\ptuk;rapbie standpoint due to their inherent Iinearit\. 
Cryptographically strong pseudo-random sequences arc produced by combining more 	~ 
than one LFSR with methods like Non-linear combination generator. Non-linear filter 
generator and Clock-controlled generator in order to introduce non linearity. 
Following this. an analysis of several existing stream ciphers including S0l31:I1 
family of stream ciphers. (;rain-128. NI.Sv2 . DRAGON stream cipher. PY (ROO) 
family of stream ciphers is presented. An attempt is made to assess the reliability of 
these ciphers in terms of security, memory requirements. speed and implementation. 
I'hc final part of this thesis presents a new stream cipher called "13OKI1.112I Stream 
Cipher". a nc\\ proposed soft\\arc-oriented stream cipher constructed using a Non-
linear feedback shift register and a Nonlinear filter function and is designed for a 
secret key that is up to 128 bits in length. The 130KIIAIZI stream cipher uses basic 
design principles from the stream cipher SOI3I'.R-tl6 and transformations dcri\cd 
from the steam cipher DRAGON. Security and Statistical analysis of 130KIIARI 
stream cipher is performed, which shows that no bias was found by any of 15 tests  
included in National Institute of Standards and I cchnology (NISI) suite and six tests 
of I :N'I' test suite. 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
Information is an asset and security is ubiquitous. 'I he motivation to keep information 
secure is obvious in many circumstances such as c-commerce, communications and 
electronic transactions. The various objectives of Information security arc 
authentication, authorization, validation, non-repudiation, availability and 
confidentiality. the need to protect information goes hack to antiquity. Since the early 
days of writing, heads of state and military commanders understood that it was 
necessary lu provide some mechanism to protect the confidentiality of written 
correspondence and to have sonic means of detecting tampering. There are several 
popular examples of secret writing. Julius Caeser, a Roman military and political 
officer in first centurs !3C is credited with the invention of Caescr cipher or shift 
cipher. In Cacscr cipher. each letter in the alphabet was replaced by letter three 
positions later. One more such popular example is the story of I listiaeus. Ilk solution 
of secrecy was that he shaved the head of his messenger. stained the message on his 
head and allowed the hair to grow back to cover the stained message before he sent 
him away. 
The word Cryptology has its origin in Greek words krypios, which means hidden and 
logos, which means word. It is believed to have emerged from ancient Egypt more 
Introduction 
than 4500 \cars ago. It has predominantly been an art form used by the military and 
governments for message confidentiality. fhc transformation of cryptolog\ from an 
art to science may have been motivated by the popularity of wireless communication 
in 1920's. However, it is the birth of computer era that arguably made open research 
in cryptography possible. ('ryptology w itncsscd a radical change with the advent of 
computer and is no more considered as a science of secret writing. It has gone from an 
art form that dealt with secret communications for military to a science that helps to 
secure system for ordinary people all across the globe. In addition to the computer 
science. cryptology uses ideas I'rom several other fields such as information theory, 
number theory. abstract algebra and quantum theory. 	Modern cryptology  
encompasses message auihenticuiiurl, digital signatures. and /)1°ule)co/s /n' 
ev('haan,lring secret kev,s'', Cluthen/icatio l /)POIDcols. electronic auction. ele('lion, 
c'/e 'Bons (111(1 cliginal c•(r.ch. 
I. of lowing is a glossary of some fundamental terms. 
l;ru l i/)iion is the process of converting a message (or /)Iclinlext) into an 
'unintelligible' form (called c•ip/lerlex!) and clecrtyuion is the reverse process. l'hc 
ciphcrtcxt is transmitted by the sender to the intended recipient of the plaintext. across 
an insecure communication channel (any third party can intercept data that flows 
through such a channel). l'he algorithm used for performing encryption and 
decryption is called the cipher. A crl'uusy'stenr can mean any system that involves 
cry ptology or just the algorithms, along with sets of possible inputs to them. that are 
used to perform encryption and decryption of messages. 
Cryptology, the study of' cryptosystctns. can be subdivided into two disciplines. 
Cryptography concerns itself with the design of cryptosystems. while 
cryptanalysis studies the breaking of cryptosystems. "These two aspects are closely 
related: when setting up a cryptosystcnl the analysis of its security plays an important 
role. Cryptography is broadly classified can the basis of number of keys used for 
encryption/decryption. Generally cryptography is classified as unkcycd cryptography. 
Asymmetric key cryptography and Symmetric key Cryptography. In this thesis. the 
primary focus is Stream ciphers. which is a variation of Symmetric key cryptography. 
In symmetric key cryptography. a single shared key is used For both encryption and 
Introduction 0 
decryption and the key needs to be kept secret. Symmetric ciphers on the basis of the 
size of block which they encrypt, falls under two categories: block ciphers and stream 
ciphers. Block ciphers are stateless and given plaintext directly output ciphertext. 
Stream ciphers maintain state and produce keystream, which is externally combined 
with the plaintext to make the ciphertexl. Stream cipher takes as input the secret key 
and a parameter called initialization vector (IV) and generates a stream of bits called 
the keystream. which is XORed with plaintext to produce ciphertext. On the basis of 
the internal state they maintain, stream ciphers are commonly classified as 
synchronous and asynchronous stream ciphers. Synchronous stream cipher generates 
the keystream independent ol'the plaintext and the ciphertext while as Asynchronous 
stream cipher generates the keystream based on the previous ciphertext. Stream 
ciphers have played and continue to play an important role in cryptography. 
This thesis deals with techniques of stream cipher design that allow efficient 
implementation in conjunction with high security. Much of the doctoral period has 
been spent in evaluating algorithms submitted to the upon competition eS'IRI AM 
b.CR Ill] and NESSIli I NESI 21. eSl REAM was a multi-year effort with the explicit 
goal to advance stateof-the-art knowledge about stream cipher design. Sponsored by 
the European Network of Excellence in Cryptography (ECRYPI), the project began 
in 2004 with proposals for new stream ciphers being invited from industry and 
academia. 'these proposals were intended to satisfy either a software-oriented or a 
hardware-oriented profile (or both if possible). The original call for proposals 
generated considerable interest with 34 proposals being submitted to the two different 
performance profiles IMIZOU8I. 'the project ended in April 2008 with an 
announcement of a portfolio of eight stream ciphers, four in each profile. This 
portfolio was revised in September 2008 when one hardware-oriented cipher, F-
lCSR-Ii v2. was eliminated. 
In 	2000 	a 	project called New F.uropean Schemes for Signatures. Integrity, 
and Encryption (NESSIF.) was initialized. The aim of this project was to collect a 
strong portfolio of cryptographic primitives- After an open call for proposals the 
submissions were thoroughly evaluated. 
Introduction 
Aim of thesis 
In this work. performance aspects ol various stream ciphers like S( )13L 	family of 
stream ciphers IMAB 1 1 J, PY family of stream ciphers 113AM l01 and Dragon stream 
cipher I Cl IIF,0 t 1 is evaluated. The aim of this thesis is to propose a new 128-hit 
software oriented stream cipher called 130KI IARI stream cipher I13 -112 ~. 
l'hesis Outline 
1'his thesis. as its name suggests. is devoted to the area of stream ciphers. It will show 
	 I 
new ideas in both stream cipher analysis and stream cipher design. the rest of the 
thesis is outlined as follows. 
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the theoretical foundations of modern days 
cr ptopraph), followed by a discussion on cryptographic primitives. Since this thesis 
is devoted to stream ciphers, this thesis analyses the symmetric key cryptography in 
detail and present a study on various modes of operation in which symmetric key 
ciphers operate. Towards the end of chapter. a discussion is carried out on 
crvptanalytic attacks on cryptographic protocols with the thrust being upon the attacks 
related to stream ciphers. 
Chapter 3 discusses the very concept of stream cipher and difiercnt design 
approaches of stream cipher development. I)iffcrcnt pseudorandom generation 
techniques arc discussed with the focus being on linear feedback shift register 
(ITSR). Linear feedback shift registers as maximal length sequence generators arc 
widely used in stream ciphers for kcv stream generation due to their good statistical 
properties. large period, love implementation costs and are readily analysed using 
algebraic techniques. I'hen this thesis discusses cryptographically strong pseudo-
random sequences that are produced by combining more than one I.I SR with methods 
like \on-linear combination generator. Non-linear filter generator and Clock-
controlled generator in order to introduce non linearity. 
Chapter 4 presents an analysis of several existing stream ciphers. this chapter first 
analyses the SOBER stream cipher and its respective variants, which have been 
developed to strengthen its security or to he suitable for I 6-hit and 32-hit processors. 
Introduction , 
\earl\ all SOB R lamil\ ciphers consists of three basic components. there is a Linear 
Iced-back Shift Register (ITSR). \\hich uses a recursion formula to generate the 
stream of pseudo-random hits. Next a Non-Linear Function (NI .F) combines these 
words in a non-linear "a\ to produce the NI.I -stream. Finally, the so-called stuttering 
produces the kevstream by decimating the NI.F-stream in an irregular fashion. A 
comparative study of various \ariants of soRl:R as carried out in terms of key 
loading. h\te ordering. memorN requirements. polynomials employed and 
implementation of I.f-Slt. 
[he members of P Tamil are software-oriented synchronous stream ciphers that are 
based on arrays, modular additions and hit-rotations. Py was one of the candidates in 
cS'fRl.AM profile I stream cipher category but as Blond to he susceptible to some 
cryptanaf)tic attacks. Several improved versions of P were submitted in form of 
fl'. 'I'1 v6 and l'Pvp~. This chapter analyzes the design and security 
specifications of P\ cipher and its variants to assess the reliability of these ciphers and 
get a better understanding for the design of  stream cipher that is more secure as cll 
as efficient. Finally chapter Ibur discusses some Non-Linear feedback shift register 
based stream ciphers including l R/ViON. GRAI\-I28 and NI.SV, The DRAGON 
stream cipher v as submitted to the cS"1'RLAM project in 2005 and had advanced to 
Phase 3 of the soft are profile. "I he design of the Dragon stream cipher incorporates a 
single word-based non-linear feedback shift register and a non-linear filter function 
%\ ith memory. the cipher uses the minimum number of operations to ensure its 
securit\. yet maintains a high level of efficiency. With a keystrcam throughput of 6.7 
cycles per byte and a key generation setup time of 1.395 cycles. Dragon is 
competitive with other Modern \\ord based stream ciphers. GRAIN-128 is a hit 
oriented s\nchronous stream cipher. It uses one NI:SR of size 128 and one I,I SR of 
sire 128 \\ ith a filter function to combine the Output of these shift registers. 
Chapter 5 of this thesis introduces a nee, stream cipher called "13okhari stream 
cipher''. a nc\\ proposed software-oriented stream cipher constructed using a Non-
linear feedback shill register and a Non linear filter function and is designed for a 
secret ke\ that is up to 128 bits in length. [he 13OKl IARI stream cipher uses basic 
design principles from the stream cipher SO13[.R-t 16 and transformations derived 
from the steam cipher DRAGON. At the end of this chapter. security and statistical 
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analysis of l30KI IARI stream cipher is performed, which shows no bias was found b) 
am of 15 tests included in NIST suite and six tests of ENT1 suite. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the contributions of the thesis and gives concluding remarks. 
Appendix I contains list of papers published during Ph.l). 
Appendix II contains the source code of 130K  JARI stream cipher. 
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The word 'Cryptology' has a Greek etymology and steins from word kr}prn.r, which 
means hidden and logos, which means study. Cryptology. 	the study of 
eryptosystems. can be subdivided into two disciplines-Cryptography and 
Cryptanalysis. Cryptography concerns itself with the design of cryptosystcros. 
while cryptanalysis studies the breaking of cryptosystems. These two aspects are 
closely related: when setting up a cryptosystem the analysis of its security plays an 
important role. 
Cryptography is the discipline of encrypting a message in an incomprehensible form 
with the use of some frequently changing key text, and decryption of this 
incomprehensible text back into the actual message, with the aim of protecting a 
secret from adversaries, intruders, interlopers. eavesdroppers or simply attackers. 
According to RFC2R2R ISI11131, cryptography can be termed as ' Ihe mathematical 
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science that deals with transforming data to render its meaning unintelligible (i.e.. to 
hide its semantic content), prevent its undetected alteration, or prevent its 
unauthorized use. If the transformation is reversible. cryptograph N also deals with 
restoring encrypted data to intelligible form." The transformation of plainte.ri (actual 
message) to ciphertexi (incomprehensible form) in order to keep the content hidden 
from unintended parties is known as encrtption and the reverse process of 
transforming the cipher text into plaintcxt is called ilecrtption. The need encryption 
and decryption comes into play because of the insecure channel over which the sender 
transmits the message to the intended recipient. Fhe aim of cryptography is not to 
hide the existence of message. but to rather hide its meaning pSI\1OOI. C rNptograph> 
studies the design of algorithms and protocols for information sccurith . 
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Cryptography 
	
Cryptanalysis 
Symmetric Cryptography 	I Asymmetric Cryptography 
Block Cipher 	 Stream Cipher 
Synchronous Stream 	 Sell'- Synchronous 
Cipher 	 Stream ('iphcr 
Fig 1: Classification of Cryptology 
l'hc need to keep information secret especially in communications is obvious in man> 
circumstances such as military, diplomatic and business aflairs. Following are the 
different security services olfcryptography: 
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• Data Confldentirrliry. The aim is to assure that the information is available 
only to authorized recipients. Confidentiality of data used to be the original purpose of 
cryptography and it is accomplished by using strong encryption algorithms. 
• Data Integrity. 'this service guarantees that the content of the message, that 
was sent. has not been tampered with. The unauthorized alteration of' data must he 
detected and only authorized users are allowed to alter the data. Data alteration 
includes such things as insertion, deletion, substitution and replication. Generally 
techniques like message authentication codes (MACs) and digital signatures are used 
to protect integrity of data. 
• Autheulkation is the act of confirming identity of an entity and establishing 
whether someone or something is what they claim to be. Resides entity identification, 
authentication also aims at data origin authentication. Data origin authentication of 
information confirms the origin, content and time of creation. Authentication is 
generally accomplished by using passwords. 
• Non-repudintian The goal is to unsure that either of the parties involved 
cannot deny any previous commitments or contracts. When disputes arise due to an 
entity denying that certain actions were taken, a means to resolve the situation is 
necessary. For example. if either of the parties has signed a contract, neither of than 
should be able to claim that it was someone else who signed the contract and them. 
Non-repudiation can be achieved by using digital signatures together with digital 
certificates. 
2.1 Cryptographic Primitives 
[he er~plographie objectives discussed above are addressed using fundamental toots 
or algorithms commonly known as Cryptographic primitives. 'These primitives are 
classified into three groups. Unkeyed primitives, Symmetric-key primirivev and 
4symmelric-key prmilives.'[he focus of this thesis is on symmetric key cryptography, 
particularly sire urn ciphers. 
2.1.1 Unkeyed Cryptography 
Unkeyed primitives play a vital role in cryptographic services mainly authentication 
and data integrity The name unkcyed primitives originates from the fact that they do 
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not use secret kcvs: thcrclorc no secrecy is involved in their algorithms. The family of 
unkcycd primitives consists main]\ of tools like hush Junctions and one wcrt• 
per►futc►tion,s'. the term flush Junction has its roots in computer science, where it 
denotes a function that compresses a string of arbitrar\ length (virtual address) to a 
string of fixed length (physical address). A hash function is a computational],\ 
efficient Function that takes strings of arbitrary length as input and map these to short 
fixed length output strings. commonl\ known as message clr,LJest or checksum. I lash 
functions are fundamental components of many cryptographic applications such as 
digital signatures, integrity protection and random generation etc. Desirable propertics 
of a good hash function are u►rifi►r►uilt', ii euk collision resistance (I1'( 'I?). .cnro►rr; 
collision resistance (XC'R) and ease of computation. Some of the wide]\ used hash 
functions used are VII)51 KR9 . SI IA-2(SI IA-224. SI lA-256. SI IA-384, SI IA-
512)1NIS12]. Ml)5 is nosy considered to be cryptographically broken and several 
attacks «ere reported on SI IA-2 Tamil). In an cl'Io>rt to replace older SI l!\-I and SI IA-
2. USNIST on No 2. 2007 announced a public competition to develop it nc%\ 
cryptographic hash algorithm that will be called as SI IA-3. NISI' selected live SI IA- 
finalists - BLAKE, Grus7/, J11, Keccak, and Skein to advance to the third (and final) 	 ~ 
round of the competition on December 9. 2010 and on March 22-23. 2012 the final 
round conlcrcnce was held in Washington l).0 to discuss the SIIA-3 finalist 
algorithms, and to solicit public feedback before NIST selects a winning algorithm fur 
standardisation. On October 2. 2012 NIST announced Keccuk as the winner of its 
five-year competition. Keccuk tpronounced "catch-ack"). was created by Guido 
13crtoni. Joan 1)acmen and (lillcs Van Asschc of S I'Microelcctronics and Michael 
Peelers ofNXP Semiconductors. 
Properties of Ideal Cr) ptographic I lash Functions. It is 
1. easy to compute the hash value for any given message. 
2. Infeasible to find a message that has a given hash. 
3. Infeasible to modify a message without hash being changed. 
4. Infeasible to find two dillerent messages with the same hash. 
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.tJessu,Ye .luiIlerrticuiion ('odes (.1/il(.'si is a variation of'hash functions that makes use 
of secret ke\ and provide data origin authentication and data integrity. MACs can 
reduce the authenticity of a large quantity of' infarmation to the secrecy and 
authenticit\ ol'a short secret ke\. 
2.1.2 Asymmetric Primitives 
As\mmetric or puhlic-kc\ :r`ptograph\ is based can the principle of making the 
cncr\ption Le' cftccti\el\ public kno\\ledge. and hiding: the details about the 
door ption ke\ li'om unauthorized users. An asymmetric primitive defines unbalanced 
capabilities between sender and receiver [CAM 101. In 1976. I)itlic and Hellman 
introduced the concept 0f public key cryptograph,, IN 1761 in order to overcome the 
limitation of communicating the secret key Faced in symmetric key cryptography. 
Asymmetric cryptography algorithms make use of' two different keys. a public key K,. 
used fir encryption and a private key K,, used tor decryption. i.e. K1.: K,1. where e and 
care encryption and decryption algorithms respectively. 
Public-kc' cr\ptugraph\ provides a nice \Nay to help \pith the key management 
problem .Although it is computationally eas} for the intended recipient to generate the 
public and private keys. to decrypt the message using the private key. and eas,, fix the 
sender to encrypt the message using the public key but it is virtually impossible to 
deduce the private key based only on the knowledge of the public key. this is %s hy. 
unlike s mmctric key algorithms, a public key algorithm does not require 
a secure initial exchange of one (or amore) secret keys between the sender and 
recei\cr. Asymmetric-key encryption (public-key encryption) provides confidentialit\ 
oti data [('AMIO[. 
2.1.3 Symmetric Primitives 
Symmetric kc\ cryptograph \ also referred to as conventional or secret Icy 
crvptugraph\ derives its name from the tact that in this class of cryptographic 
primitive, encryption and decryption processes involve same (symmetric) Ley. 
Symmetric key cry ptograph\ %%as the only type of encryption in use prior to the 
development of public key cryptograph r in 1976. Symmetric cryptograph) algorithms 
make use of a single key for both encryption and decryption. i.e. K, K,, K. where e 
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and it are encryption and decryption algorithms respectively and K is the shared key.  
I'he knowledge of encryption key is implicitly or explicitly equivalent to knowing the 
decryption key. These algorithms are typically last, much more efficient than 
asymmetric algorithms in both hardware and software and are suitable for processing 
large streams of data. Symmetric cryptograph\ also provides a degree of 
authentication because data cncrvptcd with one symmetric kc\ cipher cannot he 
decrypted with any other symmetric key cipher. I herclorc, as long as the symmetric 
key cipher is kept secret by the two parties using it to encrypt communications. each 
party can be sure that it is communicating with the other as long as the decrypted 
messages continue to make sense. 
I'hc disadvantage of symmetric key cryptography is that since the same key is used 
for both encryption and decryption thcrclbrc the kc) must he communicated in it 
secure manner prior to communication and kno\\ n at both sender and receiver 
locations. 
In the design of symmetric encryption systems. permutations and substitutions are 
usually used and combined to provide confusion and diffusion. the properties of 
confusion and diffusion were introduced by Shannon in his classic work 
"Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems" BSI IA491 and defined as follows: 
• ('onju.ciuwr: " I he method of confusion is to make the relation between the 
simple statistics of ciphertext and the simple description of plaintcxt a very 
complex and involved one". implies that the relationship between ciphcrtcxt 
and plaintext should he made so complex and obscure that the relationship can 
be determined between them. 
• Diffusion: "In the method of diffusion the statistical structure of which leads 
to its redundancy is clissijxzie l into long range statistics''. i.e. the influence of a 
single plaintext digit should be spread over a long range of ciphertcxt digits to 
hide the plaintext's statistical structure.  
Massey in IMAS92I further interpreted confusion and diffusion as, by confusion "in a 
cipher. Shannon meant that the enciphering process should be such that the ciphcrtcxt 
statistics depend on the plaintcxt statistics in it manner too complicated to be exploited 
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h\ an attacker. 13\ diffusion in a cipher. Shannon meant that each hit of the input kc\ 
should influence many Bits of the ciphcrtcxt. 
f0 summarize the above definitions. Confusion means that the key does not relate in a 
simple \%a\ to the ciphcrtcxt. In particular. each character of the ciphcrtcxt should 
depend on several parts of the key. I)itYusion means that if  character of the plaintext 
is changed, then several characters ol'the ciphcrtcxt should change. and similarly. i1 *a 
character of the ciphertcxt is changed, then several characters of the plaintcxt should 
change. 
[he combination of these tsso basic functions in multiple rounds is used to provide a 
maximum level of contusion and diffusion and good level of'secrecy. 
2.2 Classification of Svm metric Primitives: 
S\mmetric cryptograph is broadly classified as block cipher and .strewn cipher. The 
names arise from the high level structure in \shich they encrypt data 
2.2.1 Block Cipher 
Block cipher. One of the popular method cif concealing infi~rmation. works on the 
principle of dividing the input stream of plaintcxt into fixed size strings called blocks. 
typicallk 64. 128 or 256 hits long. In an attempt to generate all the blocks of same 
site, extra characters are gcnerall\ added can to the end cif'the input stream. so that the 
total number of characters in the plaintcxt is exactly divisible by the block size. I'his 
procedure of appending additional data at the end of plaintext is called as Padding. 
The resultant blocks are then encrypted one at a time. using a cryptographic key to 
produce the ciphcrtcxt and there is no correlation between the encrypting of one 
message block and anothcr.f l:RI l II Consequently a block cipher maps plaintext 
message blocks of a specific length into ciphertext blocks of the same length. In 
practice. the \ast majority of block ciphers either have a block length of 128 hits (16 
bytes) such as the advanced encryption standard (ANN). or a block length of'64 hits (8 
h)tes) Such as the data cner\ptiun standard (l)F.SI or triple l)I:S (31)I-.5) algorithm. 
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Block Cipher Modes of operation: 
A cryptographic mode usually combines the basic cipher, some sort of feedback, and 
some simple operations. The operations are simple because the security is a function 
of the underlying cipher and not the mode. Even more strongly the cipher mode 
should not compromise the security of the underlying algorithms t he hock cipher is 
typically used in one of the following five modes to encrypt plaintext blocks in order 
to break the property of the same plain text block always encrypting to the same 
cipher test block. All el the live modes have one goal: They encrypt data and thus 
provide confidentiality for a message exchanged between sender and receiver. 
2.2.1.1 Electronic Code Hook (ECB); This is the most classical scenario in which 
plaintext blocks arc encrypted independently of one another with a secret key by the 
sending device. The resuiting output blocks are concatenated to form the eiphertexf 
and are transmitted to the decrypting device, where it is decrypted with the same key. 
K 
Fig 2.1: ECB mode encryption 
One of the advantages of using ECB mode of encryption is that block synchronization 
between the sender and the receiver is not necessary. as the decryption of received 
encrypted blocks is still possible even if all encrypted blocks are not received due to 
transmission problems. Also, bit errors, e.g., caused by noisy transmission lines, only 
affect the corresponding block but not succeeding blocks and finally encryption with 
ECB is parallelisable. 
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The major limitation of the FCB mode is that it is highly deterministic. This means 
that identical plaintext blocks encrypted with same key result in identical ciphertext 
blocks. 
2.2.1.2 Cipher block Chaining Mode (OW): [his mode of operation was designed 
to remove some of the disadvantages of the ECt3 mode. l[he main idea behind the 
working of Cipher l3loek Chaining (C13C) mode is that the output is a aCqucnoc of n-
bit cipher blocks which are chained together so that each cipher block is dependent, 
not only on plaintext block from which it immediately came but on all previous 
plaintext blocks and also the encryption is randomized by using an initialization 
vector (IV). 
Initially loaded with IV 
Fig 2.2: CRC mode encryption 
2.2.1.3 Cipher Feedback Mode (CEl3): 
The cipher feedback (CF73) mode of operation uses the block cipher to generate a 
sequence of pseudorandom bits, and these bits are then XORcd with plaintexi bits to 
produce the ciphertext bits. The input shift register is initially filled with a seed value 
known as an initialization vector IV, and the underlying encryption algorithm is run 
once to produce output bits. l'he left-most s bits of the output bits are then XORcd 
with the plaintext to generate the ciphertext. l he result of this XOR operation is sent 
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over the network and also led hack to the input shift rctistcr. shiftini; the left-most .s 
hits out. I'hcn, the algorithm is run again and the next character is encrypted in the 
same manner. the IV need not be secret, since in the system it is in the position of it 
ciphertcxt but should be dillercnt for every message transmitted with the same key. 
IW C. 
Fig 2.3: CFB mode encryption 
I'hc major advantage of the CFl3 mode is in applications that normall\ don't require 
the transmission of large messages. Since in 0113 mode. block cipher emulates a 
stream cipher. Consequently. it is possible to encrypt blocks that are smaller than the 
block length of the block cipher. The limitation of ('113 mode is that it suffers error 
i 
propagation. Bit errors in the incoming cipher block will cause bit error at the same 	 ~ 
bit positions in the first plain text block and an incorrectly transmitted ciphcrtcxt 
block disturbs the decryption process until it "falls out ol'thc input register. 
2.2.1.4 Output Feedback Mode (OF13): 
he output feedback (0113) mode of' operation features feeding the successive output 
blocks from the underlying block cipher back to it. I'hc output blocks lunn a string of 
hits which are XORcd with the plaintcxt to generate the ciphcrtcxt. In contrast to ('1l3 
mode, the keystream generated in 0113 mode is computed independent of both the 
plaintcxt and ciphcrtcxt. the 01:13 node requires an IV as the initial random n-hit 
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input block. 	hich is encrypted %%ith the block cipher to generate first set of 
kcystream bits. [he following kcystrcam hits as shown in Fig 4 arc computed by 
fcceling the previous cipher Output hack into the block cipher and encrypting, it. I he 
IV need not he secret. since in the system it is in the position of a c►phertext but 
should he different fir every message transmitted with the same key. 
Fig 2.4: 0113 mode encryption 
OI li mode has an advantage over ('I I3 mode in that any hit errors that might occur 
during transmission are riot propagated to affect the decryption of subsequent blocks. 
as there arc no chaining dependencies. A problem With output feedback is that by 
changing the ciphcrtext. the plaintext can he easily manipulated, but using a digital 
signature scheme can o\ercome this problem. 
2.2.1.5 The counter (("I R) mode: 
I he counter (l  R) mode features Iceding the underlying block cipher algorithm \\ith 
a counter value hich counts up from an initial value. Kc) stream block is generated 
b) encrypting successive values of a "counter", which is then XORed with the 
plainte t blocks to generate the ciphertext. the counter can be any function \%hich 
produces a sequence hich is guaranteed not to repeat fur a long time, although an 
actual increment-h\-onc counter is the simplest and most popular. CIR mode 
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removes the limitations like error propagation and chaining dependencies faced in 
earlier discussed modes. 
2.2.2 Stream ciphers: 
Symmetric encryption system processes plaintext messages unit h\ unit, and as 
mentioned above, in the case of a block cipher a unit is called a block. Stream ciphers 
typicall\ operate on individual units of plaintext. It takes as input the secret key and a 
parameter called initialization vector (IV) and generates a stream of bits called the 
kcystrcam. which is XORed with plaintcxt to produce ciphcrtcxt. Stream ciphers have 
an internal state and on the basis of this state, stream ciphers are commonly classified 
as synchronous and asynchronous stream ciphers. Stream ciphers have played and 
continue to play an important role in cryptography. 
Design and Analysis of Stream cipher is the main topic of this thesis and henceforth 
will be discussed more thoroughly in later chapters. For a general description of 
stream ciphers. see chapter 3. 
2.3 Crvptanalvsis: 
Cryptanalysis is the technique of deriving the original message from the ciphcrtcxt 
without any prior knowledge of secret key or derivation of' key from the ciphertcxt. 
According to RFC 2828 1 5111131 the term cryptanalysis is used to refer to the 
"mathematical science that deals with analysis of a cryptographic system in order to 
gain knowledge needed to break or circumvent the protection that the system is 
designed to provide" A general technique for cryptanalysis, applicable to all 
cryptographic algorithms is to try all the possible keys until the correct key is 
matched, it is known as exhaustive key search. With every passing day. the computing 
ability of hardware is increasing manifold: therefore it becomes necessar\ to use long 
kc\s in order to avoid exhaustive kc\ search. All the other attacks applied on stream 
ciphers are compared to exhaustive key search in terms of' data and memory 
complexity and if its complexity is less than exhaustive key search, then only these 
arc considered as successful. A symmetric key cipher, especially a stream cipher is 
assumed to he secure. if' the computational capability required fir breaking the cipher 
by best known attack is greater than or equal to exhaustive key search 
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2.3.1 CrvptanalNsis Techniques 
In this section. some generic attacks on stream ciphers arc introduced. Most of the 
crNptanahhsis on stream ciphers is performed under a knoNNn plaintext assumption. 
When comparing attacks, there are three complexity measures that are of interest. 
'I'imc complcxith 
I imc complcxit of an attack can he defined in terms of number of' operations 
required to carry out that particular attack 
Data complexity 
Data cuntplexit\ of an attack can be defined in terms of' amount of observed 
ke"tream required to carr\ cut an attack successt'ull\ 
Mcmurs complcit~ 
Mcmur\ complcxit\ of' an attack can be defined in terms of amount of mcmor\ 
required to perform the attack succcsstull\. 
Some of the generic attacks on stream ciphers found in literature arc discussed belo\~ 
2.3.1.1 Exhaustive ke. Search Attack: 
In an exhaustive kc\ search attack or a brute force attack, the cryptanal)st tries all 
possible ke s to dccr\pt a ciphcrte\t and can be used against and crlptographic 
algorithm including; stream ciphers except provable secure ciphers IPf'I01 though a 
provable secure cipher is not practically teasiblc. for e.g. one time pad. lithe  kc\ siic 
is n hits, then the attacker has to try on an average 2" keys fir breaking a cipher and 
2 keys in the \\orst case. I'he computational complexity of an attack is often stated as 
O (2"). II'I'10 An attack \,\ith a higher computational complexity than an exhaustive 
kc\ search is not considered an attack at all. 
2.3.1.2 Side ('hannel :Anal%sis attack: 
hcrc arc gcncrall\ to steps involved in developing any cryptographic primitive. 
First it is defined as an abstract mathematical object. I hereafter this mathematical 
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entity needs to be implemented in form of a program and in some cases these 
programs are further implemented in some specific hardware. These programs after 
implementation will be executed in a computing environment on processing units. 
I'hcsc executions will present some specific characteristics. Side channel Analysis 
(S('A) refers to the attacks based on the ph}sically observable characteristics during 
execution. Some of the common physical characteristics that are used f)r Side 
Channel Analysis arc Power and Microprocessor time required fir execution. 
electromagnetic radiation, heat dissipation and noise of the system etc. On the basis of' 
above characteristics: there are different Side Channel attacks on ciphers in general 
and on stream cipher in particular and these arc Simple Power analysis attack and 
Differential Power Analysis attack I I"GK07.KJJ99I• 'liming Analysis attack 
II)KI.98.KOC96. Electromagnetic Analysis attacks JGMOOI.QSOI.AAR02I and 
Acoustic Cr\ptanalysis IS I'l3 are generally used and powerful techniques for Side 
Channel analysis attacks. 'Though there is no general countermeasure to these attacks 
but some of the possible countermeasures maybe noise addition. buffering of the 
Output sequence. Physical shielding, reduction of signal sire, eliminating the branch 
processing in implemented algorithm that will make the encryption time equivalent 
1,I05, SX10j. 
2.3.1.3 'Time Memory' 'Tradeoff Attack: 
A time memory tradeoff attack is a method of cryptanalysis that aims to attack a 
cryptographic primitive with lower complexity than look up table and an online 
complexity lower than exhaustive key search. 'l'M'fO is an improvement to the 
exhaustive key search attack that trades off computational time against memory 
complexity. 'l'his attack can be divided into two phases: an offline phase or pre-
computation phase and online phase. In of7linc phase a table is constructed in like 
lookup table method by selecting different random keys and generating the output lr 
each chosen key. These pairs of output strings and keys are stored in an indexed table 
indexed by the output strings. In the second phase or online phase. the attacker 
observes the output generated by unknown keys. Then these outputs are matched with 
the outputs of the table generated in the offline phase. If a match is found then 
corresponding keN will be the key off the matched output. 
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Amirazizi and I leilmen were the first to propose Time memory processor trade-off 
attack AlJ 1881 on block ciphers and in case of stream ciphers. TM'f0 was proposed 
by Babbago 13AB951 in 1995 and Colic [COL971 in 1997 independently. Later on 
13iryukoo and Samir combined 13abbagc and Gulic scheme with Ileilmen attack 
BS90J. This attack was further refined by 13irykov, Shamir and Wagner and applied 
on A511 IRS W781. 
2.3.1.4 Distinguishing attack: 
The idea of this attack was introduced by Fluhrcr and McGrew on alleged RC4 key 
stream generator I _000j and can be defined as any form of cryptanalysis where the 
attacker can extract some information from encrypted data sufficient to distinguish it 
from random data. The most important criterion for a good stream cipher design is 
that kevstrcam generation should to he random. Distinguishing attack tries to identify 
the relations between internal state variables and output keystrcam. The internal 
structure of a cipher has to be analyzed extensively for distinguishing attack. Ciphers 
are required to use sufficiently long keystream to avoid distinguishing attacks. 
2.3.1.5 Algebraic attack 
Algebraic attacks are relatively new attacks for stream ciphers and progress is rapidly 
taking place in this field. Algebraic attacks are very much effective against I.[SR 
based ciphers. The basic principle of algebraic attacks is to model a cryptographic 
system in terms of algebraic equations. The first step ofthis attack is to find the set of 
algebraic equations that links the initial state with the output keystream. then 
keystrcam bits are observed and these values are substituted into the equations. 
Attackers try to collect maximum possible keystream bits. "then finally this system of 
equations is solved to determine the initial state and than derive the secret key from it. 
Algebraic Attack on stream cipher was first proposed by Courtois in [C0002I against 
Toyerypt. Later on Courtois further enhanced this attack and proposed Fast Algebraic 
attack COIJ03I that was firther strengthened by Armknecht IARM04I. the idea 
behind fast algebraic attack was to get equations of lower degree by linearly 
combining the equations before solving the system of equation that drastically 
increases the speed of the attack. 
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2.3.1.6 Correlation attacks 
(correlation attacks are widely applicable to stream ciphers. cspccially to design based 
on lecdback shill registers. A correlation attack tries to extract some information 
about the initial state from the output keystream by exploiting the weaknesses in the 
combining function ol'the design. 
Siegenthaler first introduced the Correlation attack against combination generator 
SIE851 in 1985 but this attack was further improved by Meier and Slaf1clbach in 
1989 as Fast Correlation Attack I MS88 . /.hang and I:cng proposed an improved last 
correlation attack on stream ciphers in /F09 . Correlation-immune li►nctions need to 
be implemented for avoiding such attacks. In the case of LFSRs. the irregular 
clocking is one of the concepts to avoid linearity that will help in countering this 
attack. 
2.3.1.7 Guess-and-(Ietermine attacks: 
Guess and determine attacks arc general attacks on stream ciphers. i\s it is clear Irom 
the name. in Guess and determine attacks, an attacker guesses a part of the internal 
state and tries to recover the fill value of internal states by observing the kcystrcam  
using; the guessed part and small amount of known kcystrcam. I inall) it part of 
kcystrcam is generated using the guessed values and then it is compared with the 
known kcystream to check the correctness ol the guessed values. In I MA 1061 guess 
and determine attack was given against Polar Bear. Guess and determine attacks were 
also presented in IIlIZO21 against S\()41. [3y irregular clocking, resistance against 
guess and determine attack can be increased. Guess and determine attacks are more 
effective against word oriented stream ciphers 
2.3.1.8 Linear Masking attacks: 
Linear masking attacks can he applied to those ciphers where there exist some non-
linear process resembling block cipher design and in which linear masking is used to 
hide this process. In this attack first of all a non-linear characteristic is distinguished 
that is exhibiting some bias. Then linear process is analysed and some linear 
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combination is missing. I he same linear combinations arc applied to the cipher output 
and an attempt is made to find the traces of distinguishing property. Coppersmith ct 
al. in SCIIJO2I described a generic attack on stream ciphers using linear masking. 
Watanabe ct al. proposed linear masking attack on SNOW I WA'I 04I. 
2.3.1.9 Related Kc\ Attack: 
In an attempt to provide a little hit of extra safety or security, some of the 
cr\ptographic protocol limits the amount of data which can he encrypted using a 
single ke\. In such cases either the nc\% kcr is generated with using the IV 
(initialisation vector) and with master key or to change the IV which in turns change 
the cipher kc\ In such type of ciphers. if the rekeying strategy relates the inputs to the 
internal states \\ithout sufficient non-lincarit\. then the cipher may become prone to a 
related ke\ attack. I hose tNpes oi' \~cakncsscs are not very common in case of stream 
ciphers but there are some examples of related kc\ attacks. I Iuhrcr ct.al. in I I \ISO I j 
shoed the related key attack on R('4 by exploiting a weakness of invariance in the 
ke initialization algorithm. Sekar ct al. presented a related key attack can I'y-family of 
stream ciphers I S1107I. 1351- I I. 
2.3.1.1(1Divide and conquer attack 
I)i%ide and conquer is a common technique based on dividing the problem into 
smaller problems and try to solve it in step by step procedure. Divide and conquer 
attack is based on same strategy where in a cipher is partitioned into smaller 
components and only a Ic\\ key bits are determined in each stage. The attack can he 
termed as successI'ul onl\ if complexities of all the stages are smaller than the 
exhaustive kc\ search. Ifhis concept was originally pointed out by Siegenthaler 
SIl. 	I. I ligh correlation immunit\ decreases the vulnerability to divide and conquer 
attack I S 11.861. 
his chapter gives an insight of cr\ ptology and its related concepts and begins \v ith an 
introduction of cr\ptography and its classification. further the symmetric key 
cr\ptograph\ and different modes in v%hieh symmetric key cryptograph operates is 
discussed. Since this thesis is devoted to stream ciphers, this chapter presents some 
Cryptology 
basic concepts of stream cipher here and will be discussed in detail in next chapter. At 
the end. a study of existing cryptanalytic attacks on stream ciphers is presented. 
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Building Stream Cipher 
Stream cipher is a symmetric encryption algorithm, which typically operates on 
individual units of plaintext. A stream cipher generates a pseudo random sequence of 
digits known as the keystrcam. which is used to encrypt the plaintext in order to 
obtain the ciphcrtext. Encryption is accomplished by combining the keystream with 
the plaintext, usually with the hitwise XOR operation. The central issue for the 
security of stream ciphers is the method in which the keystream is generated. A 
stream cipher comprises of a state update function and an output function. the state of 
cipher is an allocation of memory which at time: uniquely represents the values of the 
set of variables that describes the current status of the cipher and is updated 
continuously during encryption, in order to encrypt bits at different positions in a 
message with different states. The output function is responsible for generation of 
keystream bits from the state and also performs the operation of encryption or 
decryption. An initial state of the stream cipher is normally determined by the secret 
key and a publicly known Initialization Value or Initial vector (IV),In an attempt to 
generate next state. the cipher outputs some bits known as the keystream. and then 
elevates to the next state where the process is repeated. The transition from one state 
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to the next is controlled by a clock. "I'he kcystrcam produced should be as random 
looking as possible in order to make it more resistant to attacks. Such a sequence is 
also called a Pseudorandom sequence. 
I'hc main objective of a stream cipher is to produce a pseudorandom sequence of 
symbols known as the kc\stream. A pseudorandom sequence is a deterministically 
generated sequence that exhibits the characteristics of a truly random sequence. fhc 
characteristics that define a random sequence are determined through statistical 
measures and hinar\ digit bias measurements. Desired properties of pseudorandom 
sequence are a long period and uniform distribution I FN( ;071. The generated 
ke}stream is then mixed sequentially with the plaintext to produce ciphcrtcxt. 
Stream ciphers are normall\ Caster than block ciphers and do not cost more to 
implement in terms of hardware gates or mcmor). I hc\ have also limited error 
propagation. if the encrypted data is corrupted on the channel. 
A stream cipher operates in two phases: 
I. Setup phase: In the setup phase. the state of cipher is inivali,ed by a 
scheduling procedure with the aid of the key and possibly an initialization 
vector. An initialization procedure is then perfbrmcd to make sure that all IV 
bits and kc\ hits are properly mixed and spread across the entire state. 
II. 1f.nc•rrptia1L/dcrc•rl•piiu!r phase: In this phase. stream cipher generates kcv 
stream symbols as a function of an internal state and secret key. I'his 
ke stream is then combined with the message to form the cipher text. 
l)ecr\ption is done in a similar fashion. 
3.1 Stream Cipher Classification 
Stream ciphers. commonly on the basis of kc)stream generation. are classified as 
synchronous or self-synchronous stream cipher. In sinchronous .Shea!n ciphers. the 
next state of the cryptosystem is yielded independent of both the plaintext and 
ciphertext. \\hilc as in .veIJ stnchrnni:e l .clreanr ciphcr.v: ke stream generation 
depends on the collection of plaintcxt and ciphcrtcxt. As already mentioned in the 
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introduction of stream ciphers, stream ciphers suffer very limited error propagation. In 
case of synchronous stream ciphers, If an element of the ciphcrtext sequence is 
modified accidently or intentionally (but not deleted), then only the corresponding 
plaintext element is afloctcd in the deciphered plaintext. provided that 
synchronization is maintained. In self-synchronous stream ciphers, an insertion. 
deletion, or change in ciphertext characters results in loss of only a fixed number of 
deciphered plaintext characters, after which the deciphering self-synchronizes. A 
ciphertexi error in transmission aflects at most i characters of the deciphered 
plaintext. 
Key K 
Key Stream 
Generator 
Kcvstream Si 
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Fig 3.1: Synchronous Stream Cipher 
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Fig 3.2: Self-Synchronous Stream Cipher 
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3.2 Random Number Generation 
( r ptographic applications require unifi0rmlN distributed random strings, but physical 
random processes usually aren't perlcct because they generate highly unpredictable. 
vet not uniformly distributed. values. Fortunatcl%. the mathematical and computer 
~cicncc communities have developed ways to extract pure randomness From high-
entropy sources 
3.2.1 Randomness: A colloquial definition of random process is one whose 
Consequences are unknown. Since randomness provides a way to create information 
that an adversary can't learn or predict. this attribute makes randomness crucial in 
cryptographic applications. it then becomes the task of' good protocol designer to 
leverage this poorer in the best possible way to protect data and communication. I'he 
following two criteria f RAN 13 f are used to validate that it sequence of numbers is 
random: 
3.2.1.1 Uniform distribution: Fhc distribution of numbers in the sequence should he 
such that the Frequency of Occurrence of each of the numbers should he 
approximatclk the sane. There are well-defined tests for determining whether 
a sequence of numbers matches a particular distribution, such as the uniform 
distribution 
3.2.1.2 Statistically 	Independent: I.ach number drawn must he statistically 
independent of' the others intuitively No one value in the sequence can he 
inferred from the others. There is no such test to "prove" independence. 
Rather, a number of tests can be applied to demonstrate if a sequence does not 
exhibit independence. 'f'he general strategy is to apply a number of such tests  
until the confidence that independence exists is sutticiently strong. 
(icnerall\ there are two main approaches to random number generation using, it 
computer: Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRN(is) and 'I rue Random Number 
Generators (TRNGs) I RAN 131. Although there is one more noted approach termed as 
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Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Number Generators (CSPRNG) (PR1:09(. 
[he approaches have quite different characteristics and each has its pros and cons 
3.2.2 Pseudo Random Number generator 
Pseudo random number generators ( RN(1s) use deterministic algorithm to generate 
numerical sequences by starting with a short random number string (a "seed") and 
then expand it into a much longer "random-looking" sequence. Though the output 
sequence is not statistically random, ho%tever. if the algorithm is good, the resulting 
sequences ill pass man, reasonable tests of randomness. Such numbers are referred 
to as pseudorandom numbers. It is important to note that a PRN(i is a deterministic 
process IIIV1051: put hack in the same state. it III reproduce the same sequence. as  
ill t'%o PR\(;s initialized ith the sane seed. 'I his property makes PIZNGs suitable 
for use as stream ciphers. It can he sho\\n that a PR'I'G is necessarily periodic: the 
sequence it produces «ill repeat itsclf'aftcr a (possibly extremely long) period. 
Pseudo-random number generators must satisfy all the ftrllowing conditions: 
(a) 'l he statistical properties are close to that of a true random number. A past or 
' 	 future unkno\\n output hit is hard to predict from the knoN\n output bit history. 
(h) The seed site must he large enough to he secure against an exhaustive kc> search 
of the system that uses a pseudorandom number generator. 
(c) I he statistical properties of pseudorandom number generators must pass a typical 
statistical test suite for randomness. ( I IV"I'05 ( 
3.2.3 'Prue Random Number Generators (TRN(;) 
I rue random number generators (I RNGs) are characterized h\ the tact that their 
output cannot he reproduced and sequences of numbers produced are not predictable. 
'l he characteristics of l RNGs are quite different from l'RNGs. First. I'It\(is arc 
generally rather i,tr(/iciqrse compared to PRNGs. taking considerably longer time to 
produce numbers. Also unlike Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRN(is), [rue 
random number generators are rrnndererministic. meaning that a given sequence of 
numbers cannot be reproduced. although the same sequence may of course occur 
several times h\ chance. I RNGs have no period I  RAN 13 
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3.2.4 Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Number Generators 
(CSPIR\(;) 
('ry ptographically secure pseudorandom number generators (('SP RNGs) are a special 
t\pc of'PRNG \\hich possess the additional property of unprcdictabilit\. Intuitively. :1 
PRBG is a cryptographically secure random number bit generator (('SNIZI3() if' fi r 
the generated output sequence, it can be proven that no polynomial-time algorithm 
exists to solve the next hit test. Informally, this means that given n Output hits of the 
kc\ stream s, ,s,.,,...,,,.,, , \%here n is some integer, it is coinputationalI\ infeasible to 
compute the subsequent bits s,.n,s,.,,. i ..... A more exact definition is that given n 
consecutive bits of the kc\ stream, there is no polynomial time algorithm that can 
predict the next bit s. with better than 50% chance of success. Another property of 
('SPRN(i is that given the above sequence, it should be computationally infeasible to 
compute any preceding bits s, i , s, 2. It is important to note here that the need tier 
unpredictability of ('SPR\Gs i5 unique to cryptography. In virtually all other 
situations where pseudorandom numbers are needed in computer science or 
engineering, unpredictability is not needed. 
3.3 Basic Building Blocks of stream cipher 
I his section describes some commonl\ used building blocks for the construction of 
stream ciphers. the chapter starts with a description cif a linear feedback shift register. 
~\hich is a very popular building block in stream cipher primitives and then the focus 
is shifted to \on-linear feedback shill registers, which gives us an opportunity to 
avoid the inherent linearity faced in I,FSRs. Following this, a discussion is presented 	 , 
on various methods of' introducing nonlincarity. 
3.3.1 Linear feedback shift register 
linear feedback Shift Registers (I.I:SIZs) have always received considerable attention 
in cryptograph,\. (h\ing to the grind statistical properties, large period and lo\\ 
implementation costs. I JFSR have achieved \\ ide acceptance in developing stream 
ciphers. An I,I SR is a shift register that, using feedback, elevates the hits through the 
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register from current location to the next most-significant location, on each rising 
edge of the clock. Selected Outputs (taps) arc combined in an exclusive-OR (or 
exclusive-NOR) fashion to form a feedback mechanism, which causes the value in the 
shift register iterate endlcssly through a sequence of unique values. An I.I'SR of any 
given site n f number of registers) is capable of producing every possible state during 
the period \ 21 '-1 excluding the all-zero state, such a sequence is called maximal 
sequence (abbreviated as nm-sequence).Lincar fecdback shill registers as maximal 
length sequence generators are widely used in stream ciphers for key stream 
generation due to their good statistical properties, large period, low implementation 
costs and are readily analysed using algebraic techniques. Maximal length sequences 
are generated \\ hen the I.I SR passes through ever,, non-zero state once and only once 
and are obtained 	hen the Icedback polynomial to which I.I SR corresponds is 
primitive 1Jil)091. a feedback polynomial of degree n is primitive if it is irreducible 
(cannot he factored) and has a period equivalent to 2"-I. 
f'1f;3.3: Linear feedback shift Register (LFSR) 
Ihe predominant characteristic like large linear complexities. large period, statistical 
properties and pseudo randomness of the key stream generated by LFSR make I.FSR 
a good choice tier developing stream ciphers besides allowing a ready algebraic 
anal\ sis of key stream generated by linear feedback shift registers 
3.3.1.1 Mechanism of an I.FSR: 
he implementation of I incur feedback shift register consists of n input shift 
registers, where the input bit is calculated as a linear function of the content of the 
register. An n stage I.FSR consists of clocked storage elements in the them of a shift 
register S and a Iccdback path in the form of tap sequence 'f \\here shift register 
S'(S,.S 	.Sri-..........s',) and a tap sequence 1 (t,,.ln. r .t n- .........t1). with each s1 and t, 
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being one binary digit. At each clock interval, all the hits arc shifted right except hit 
s i , which is appended to the key stream, and a nc++ hit derived from S and 'I is led 
hack as input to the left end of the register. Whether a feedback is active or not is 
determined by Icedback coefficients I' (t,,, t„_ i ...t i ) 
• 1 f t, 	I. feedback is active 
• ft — 0. lccdback is passive 
A Linear feedback function produces a sequence S. satisfying the linear recurrence 
function. Assuming that the LFSR is initially loaded with some seed value s,,. s i . 
s,...s„- i . the next output hit is computed by the XOR-sum of products operation of 
storage elements and corresponding taps: 
S„= .+„ ft„i+ ...+ s J1/+.snIo moil 2 
Similarly next output is: 
-t X21,+s,1n modl 2 
Finally the general output can be shown as: 
S,,., =~,~=o tj Si + jmod2 
Since the number of recurring states is finite. the generated sequence produced by 
ITSR must repeat itself after a finite period and also the length of the sequence is 
completely determined by the feedback coefficients and seed value. 
Since an n-bit vector can assume only 2"-1 states excluding an all-icro state. An n-bit 
I.I SR can deterministically assume its next state based on its previous state, as a 
result of which, as soon as an LFSR encounters a previous state. It starts to repeat  
itself'. Therefore the maximum sequence length without repetition is 2°-l. An all-icro 
state is discarded because if an I.FSR assumes this state. it will get "stuck” and will 
never be able to leave this state. 
An I.I SR with a Iccdhack coefficient vector 'l'(t,,,.,...t 1 . to ) is often specified with the 
help of poly nomial: 
/(x) 	X ' elm-1.Y 	I f)jx /o 
In order to have a maximal length sequence. the fecdback polynomial of the I.FSR 
should be primitive. Primitive polynomial is an irreducible polynomial of degree n. 
whose period is 2”- I. The degree of the polynomial is the length of the shift register. 
An important aspect of irreducible and primitive polynomial is that all the 
primitive polynomials are irreducible but the reverse is not true. For example. 
Building stream cipher 
the polynomial x4 r xFl 	is irreducible as well as primitive whereas the 
polynomial x't rx3+x2+x+1 is irreducible but not primitivef WIN08], An irreducible 
polynomial p(x) of degree n is not said to be primitive if its order is not 2" 1. [here 
may be more than one primitive polynomial of order n>2, 'I-he number of such 
primitive polynomials can he determined through the factorization theorem. The 
number of primitive polynomials of degree n is: 
0(2- — 1) 
It 
WhcrcO(x), known as the Ruler function, denotes the number of positive integers less 
than the integer x and relatively prime to it. [ZYW91] 
Modification of the feedback scheme allows us to implement IFSR in two dillerent 
variations. "[hough the variations are cryptographically no better. but it can still affect 
the periodicity and software implementation ISCH96I. Based on the configuration of 
gates and registers, LFSR can be divided in two categories_ 
• The Elba pace! LFSI?, aS known as External-XOR LFSR or just LPSR 
• The Galois LI SR. also known as Internal-XOR or canonical LFSR 
In the I- ibonacci implementation, the taps are XORed sequentially with the output bit 
and the led back into the Icflrnost bit. The shift register is initially loaded with bits ao, 
a,... a-.t called the seed value (any value except all zeroes) and then clocked while as 
in the Galois implementation. with each clock cycle, bits that are not taps are shifted 
one position to the right unchanged. "the taps on the other hand, arc XORed with the 
output bit before they are stored in the next bit. The shill register is initially loaded 
with bits at,- a,... art called the seed value (any value except all zeroes) and then 
clocked. 
3.3.1.2 Desirable properties of LFSR-based keystrcem 
While designing cryptosystcm it becomes imperative liar cryptographers to consider 
suitable criteria for keystream generator to he used in cipher. Some of these design 
criteria are large linear complexity, large period and good statistical properties 
Building stream cipher 
a) Linear complexity: 
It is defined as length n of shortest I.I SR that can mimic the generated output IA 	71. 
It is an indication for ho%% difficult a sequence might be to replicate. While a high 
linear complexity is a ncccssary condition. it is not a Sufficient condition. 
b) Period: 
For an I. stage I,FSR. period is defined as the length of the stream. before it repeats 
itself. An I.[SR with short Period results in encryption of different parts of plainlexi 
with same key stream. which causes severe weakness. Practically, the period should he 
long enough to accommodate entire plaintcxt without repeating the keystream. l'he 
longest period possible corresponds to the largest possible state space. which is 
produced by a maximal length tap sequence. Maximality of period guarantees good 
statistics. I /YW91 
c) Statistical measures: 
Once the sequence has been generated. it is required to assess it statisticall\. how well 
it is generated. Several statistical tests exist to determine the statistical behavior of the 
sequence. l'hcsc include run test. rank test. 1'rcquenc\ test. Fourier transform test. 
serial test. Lcmpcl-%iv complcxit\ test and linear complexity test. I('1386I I hrsc tests 
generally check for random distribution, linear dependence among I ixcd length 
substrings. distribution of ones and zeroes in a sequence. the level of compression that 
can be carried out on tested sequence and whether a sequence is complex enough to 
be considered random 
I.l SRs are notoriously insecure from a cryptographic standpoint because the structure 
o1 an n-bit [[SR can he easily deduced by observing ?n consecutive bits of its 
sequence using the l3crlckamp-Massey algorithm II)U1309 . Although Properties like 
large period, large linear complexity and a good statistical behavior are necessary but 
arc not sufficient condition for a stream cipher to be considered cryptographically 
secure. I)uc to the inherent linearity. 1.1 SR based stream ciphers are susceptible to 
several general attacks including known plaintcxt attack IPI'10I. algebraic attack 
I VO R071. cache timing attack 1,/I 1091. fast correlation attack ICAN051. 
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3.3.2 Nonlinear Feedback shift register 
Non-Linear Feedback Shill Registers (NLFSRs) have been proposed as an alternative 
to Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LPSRs) for generating pseudo-random sequences 
for stream ciphers. A Non-linear Feedback Shill Register (NLFSR) consists of n 
binary storage elements, called hits. teach bit i has an associated state variable x, which 
represents the current value of the bit i and a feedback function 1 which determines 
how the value of i is updated. A state of an NLFSR is an ordered set of values of its 
state variables (xu, x i .._ x„ 1). At every clock cycle, the next state is determined from 
the current state by updating the values of all bits simultaneously to the values of the 
corresponding f,. NI.PSRs have been shown to be more resistant to cryptanalytic 
attacks than LFSRs. I lowever. construction of large NLFSRs with guaranteed long 
periods remains an open problem. 
Cryptographically strong pseudo-random sequences are produced by combining more 
than one I-FSR with some method to introduce non linearity. - Ihree general methods 
of combining LPSRs employed to overcome the problem of linearity in LFSR based 
stream ciphers are: 
• Nonlinear combination generator 
• Nonlinear filter generator 
• Clock-controlled generator 
3.3.3 Non Linear Combination Generator 
[he key stream is generated by manipulating the outputs of several parallel LFSRs 
using a nonlinear Boolean function f.  The function f is called the combining function 
and maps one or more binary input variables to a binary output variable. The Boolean 
Function must have a high algebraic degree. high nonlinearity and preferably a high 
order of correlation immunity. The keystream generated z is given by z = f(xl,x2 .... 
xn). where xl.x2.._xn are the outputs of n-sub generators. General model for a 
nonlinear combination generator is shown in figure below 
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Fig 3.4: Nonlinear combination generator 
If n maximum-length I i SRs with lengths l,,l ', ...1„ are used together with the 
Boolean function L the linear complexity of the key stream is 
J ('1,12....1„) 	a 	al// • ...unl„ • ...a, 	„/ / 12 .....I„ 
here a.a ; ...a, arc the coel hcicnts of in the algebraic normal lorm of/.l \VIN08 
3.3.4 Non linear Filter Generator 
A nonlinear filter generator uses a single maximum length I,I SR. and the kcvstreanm 
is generated as a nonlinear function Iof'the state of the I.I SR. 
Fig 3.4: Nonlinear filter generator 
I he function J is called the filtering function. In this generator a single maximum 
length I.FSR is used in contrast to the nonlinear combination generator \\- here several 
1,1-SRs %\ere used and different stages of single I.FSR are used as input t the filtering 
Ilrnction I. 11'a nonlinear filter generator is constructed by using a maximum-length 
I.I'SR of length I. and a filtering function I of' nonlinear order m then the linear 
complexity of the kevstrcam is at most: 
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11. = S.i-1(i) 	 [OZG06]. 
In particular. hone are some problems with nonlinear-feedback shift register 
sequences. 
• '[*here may be biases, such as more ones than zeros or fewer runs than 
expected, in the output sequence. 
• "[he maximum period of the sequence may be much lower than expected_ 
• "[he period ol'the sequence might be different for different staring values 
• The sequence may appear random for a while, hut then °dead end' into a 
single value, 
([ his can easily be solved by XORing the nonlinear function with the rightmost bit.) 
On the plus side, if there is no theory to analyze nonlinear-feedback shift registers for 
security, there are few tools for crt'ptanalysis of stream ciphers based on them. 
Nonlinear-feedback shill registers can be used in stream-cipher design, but it should 
be used carefully. 
3.3.5 Clock Controlled Generator 
In clock controlled generators, the movement of data ofone LFSR is controlled by the 
output of another I.FSR. The register enabling clocking control is called as control 
register. and denoted as CR. The register which generates keystream according to the 
output sequence of CR is called as generator register, and denoted as GR_ If all) 
represent the bit produced by CR and h/i/ represent the bit produced by (iR at instant 
I. the output of the keystrcam generator at time i is given as 
u(i) 	k_1 a(k) 	 [JJD09J 
Since GR is clocked in an irregular manner, the output is the nonlinearly decimated 
sequence of a regularly clocked generator. General model for a nonlinear combination 
generator is shown in figure 3.5: 
R 	'R 	IGana Clock 
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Fig 3.5: Clock controlled generator 
3.3.6 Boolean function 
Cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generators are of vital importance 
for stream cipher design and I,TSRs though not secure due to their inherent linearity. 
are commonly used as part of ke stream generators in stream ciphers due to their 
i ood statistical properties, large periods and low implementation costs. 
Boolean functions are the building blocks of symmetric cryptographic systems. 
Boolean functions used in cryptographic applications have to satisfj various 
cryptographic criteria. Although the choice of' the criteria depends on the 
cryptosysicWl in which the are used. there are some properties (balanccdncss. 
nonlinearity, high algebraic degree. correlation immunity, propagation criteria) hich 
a cryptographically strong Boolean function ought to have. A Boolean function is said 
to be balanced if' its truth table has equal number of ones and zeros. A Boolean 
function is said to he correlation immune of order i n, it the Output cif the function is 
statistically independent of the combination of any nr of its inputs. The nom-lincarity 
of a Boolean function can be defined as the distance between the function and the set 
of all affinc functions. In stream ciphers. they are usually used to combine the Outputs 
to several linear feedback shift registers. or to filter (and combine) the contents of'a 
single one. I'hc sequence of their output. during a certain number of clock cycles. then 
produces the pseudo-random sequence that is used in stream ciphers. 
3.3.7 S-13OX 
An S-Box (Substitution-box) is a basic component of svnlmctric key algorithms used 
for substitution, that generally takes in hits as input and transforms them into n 
number of output hits . where n is not necessarily equal to m. 
S-Box S,: O. 1}", 	 O. l;" 
An in x n S-Box can he implemented as a lookup table with 2m words of n hits each. 
Fixed tables are normally used. as in the I)FS, but in some ciphers the tables are 
generated dynamically From the key which performs substitution l'hcsc S-boxes are 
carefully chosen to resist linear and differential cryptanalysis II II.YO2J. One obvious 
characteristic elf the S-box is its size. An in x n S-box has in input hits and n output 
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bits. Larger S-boxes, by and large. are more resistant to differential and linear 
cryptanalysis ISC196]. On the other hand, larger the dimension n (exponentially). 
larger the lookup table. "thus. for practical reasons, a limit of n equal to about 8 to 10 
is usually imposed. Another practical consideration is that the larger the S-box, the 
more difficult it is to design it properly 
Design Criteria of Good S-Box 
• Balanced Component functions 
• Non-linearity of Component functions high 
• Non-zero linear combinations of Component functions balanced and highly 
non-Linear 
• High Algebraic degree 
Nyberg who has written a lot about the theory and practice of S-box design, suggests 
the following approaches [R08951: 
• Random: Use some pseudorandom number generation or some table of 
random digits to generate the entries in the S-boxes. This may lead to boxes 
with undesirable characteristics for small sizes (e.g., 6 x 4) but should be 
acceptable for large S-boxes (e.g., S x 32). 
• Random with testing: Choose S-box entries randomly, then test the results 
against various criteria, and throw away those that do not pass 
• human-made: this is a more or less manual approach with only simple 
mathematics to support it. It is apparently the technique used in the DES 
design. [his approach is difficult to carry through for large S-boxes 
• Math-made: Generate S-boxes according to mathematical principles. By 
using mathematical construction, S-boxes can be constructed that offer proven 
security against linear and differential cryptanalysis, together with good 
diffusion. 
This chapter has elaborated upon stream ciphers and had a closer look on various 
techniques of stream cipher design. Due to their distinct properties. stream 
ciphers are suitable for several applications. Most notably, they are usually faster 
and have a lower hardware complexity than block ciphers. They are also 
appropriate when hollering is limited, since the digits are individually encrypted 
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and decrypted. Moreover. synchronous stream ciphers are not affected by error-
propagation. 
Analysis of existing stream ciphers 
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Analysis of existing stream ciphers 
Analysis of Existing Stream Ciphers 
Stream ciphers are cryptographic primitives that ensure the confidentiality of 
communications. I his chapter is intended to provide an insight of several stream 
cipher proposals found in literature. the existing stream ciphers can roughly be 
classified as ciphers either optimized for software implementation or optimized for 
hard«are implementation. In the former case, the ciphers typically require few Cl'l, 
instructions to compute one kc\ stream hit. In the latter case. they tend to be based on 
operations which can easily he realiied in hardware. A third class cif stream ciphers is 
rcalired by using block ciphers as building blocks. The cipher feedback mode, output 
feedback mode and counter mode that were introduced in Chapter 2 arc examples of 
stream ciphers derived from block ciphers. Even though many stream ciphers have 
been proposed over the \ears, there are considcrabl\ Icwwcr well-investigated ones. 
the securitl of mans proposed stream ciphers is unknown, and many stream ciphers 
have been broken. f)ificrent stream ciphers dealt in this chapter have been part of high 
profile stream cipher projects like cS I REAM I EC R 10 and NFSSIF. INF.S 121. 
Analysis of existing stream ciphers 	s 
4.1 SOBER family, of stream ciphers 
SO131•:R. a contrived acronym for seventeen octet h\tc enabled register. is a family of 
stream ciphers. \cidel}y used in embedded devices and was originally proposed b G. 
Rose in 1998. I he SO13111 tamil\ ciphers include SO131;R I ROS 1981. SO BI:R-II 
ROS298 I.  S16, S32 I ROSOO J. SO13FR-t8. SOBER-t 16. S013E.R-t 32 I ROS398 I  and 
SORER-1281118032 J. S0l3[R I ROS 198J first member of the family. is a soliware 
stream cipher that was designed with the intent of meeting the essentials of embedded 
applications such as voice encryption in wireless telephones which place severe 
constraints on the amount of processing power. program space and memory available 
for soft are encryption algorithms. Several variants of SOBER have been developed 
to strengthen its security or to be suitable for 16-hit and 32-hit processors. When 
various weaknesses were found in the original design of SOI3FR161. it was 
superseded by SOBER-I l and two SOBER variants: S 16 and S32 1 ROS4981, l'he 
analyses of SOI3FR-ll found attacks that arc specific to the overall structure of the 
cipher. rather than exploiting a weakness of the individual components used in the 
cipher. 
516 copies the structure of SORER-Ill ROS4198) and is an enhancement of it to 16-hit 
wide arithmetic. while S32 is an extension of the design principles of SOBER to 32-
hit wide arithmeticI ROS398. IIROOI and its structure is dillercnt from SO131•:R-11's 
and S 16's. Nevertheless, there were opportunities for strengthening SOBER-Il and 
S16 that could not be ignored. Consequently. three ncvv versions based on 8-bit. 16-hit 
and 32-bit operations. called the t-class of'SO13LR ciphers I llROOI were developed as 
a substitute to SORNR-I I. S16 and 32-hit version. l'he synchronous stream ciphers 
SORER-t16 and SOBER-t32 %\ere submitted to the NESSIE program 1131,111: as a  
stream cipher for 128-hit key and 256-bit key strength respectively. though both 
ciphers were found to fall short o1'the stringent NESSIE requirements hut according 
to final NFSSIF security report released in Feb 2003. there were only four stream 
cipher primitives k%hich were considered during the phase II: 
I3MGl.l/..I/,U9I.SNOWII•JOOj. SORER-t-16 and SOI3N;It-t-32lIIROOJ.Subsequent to 
NE:SSIF. SORN,R-128 IIlR032I is an enhanced version of SOI3l;R-t32. File 
modifications directly address the concerns arising in the analyses of the t-class 
ciphers. 1'he 128-bit key strength proposed for SORER-128 is reduced from the 256- 
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hit key strength proposed for SOBER-t32 to ensure that SORFIR-128 provides far in 
excess of the stated security level. SOBER-128 was developed as a very conservative 
stream cipher, but with innovative (and flawed) message integrity functionality 
[I IR032j. 
In the recent past enhancements to sober 128 have been developed in the form of 
NI.S, NISv2, SHANNON. TURING, and GOOLE. 
4.1.1 Description of SOBER 
The SOBER families of ciphers are based on the same principle and have almost 
similar structure. Nearly all SOBER family ciphers consists of three basic components 
I I IR032 I. there is a Linear Feed-back Shift Register (LFSR), which uses a recursion 
formula to generate the stream of pseudo-random bits. Next a Non-Linear Function 
(NIP) combines these words in a non-linear way to produce the NLP-stream v. 
Finally, the so-called stuttering produces the keystream r, by decimating the NLF-
stream in an irregular fashion. 
Register 	Non-linear function 	Stutter Control 
Figure 4.1: Block structure of SOBER family ciphers 
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4.1.1.1 Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) 
I'he SOI3ER Tamil\ ciphcr's [[SR's are typically based on recurrence relation over 
	
the Galois Field of order 2 GI: (2w). \' 	{8. 16, and 32;. the output sequence (of 
hits) is defined by 
Jii ! 	(.+ A. ,S,, Al ' (J_i. , A '' ... 	' (',S,7 ! ' (IM),r, I R0S3981 
Where Sn is the n-th output of the sequence. the constant coefficients c, , 0< i < k-
/,arc elements of GI (2) . that is, single hits, and k is called the order of the 
i 
recurrence relation. 	 I 
[he LFSR is typically represented by the polynomial 
P,(vi 	.vA • ck._/xx-1 	c•A xA 	.... I c• /X , cn I R0S ;98 I 
Where p1(x) indicates that multiplication and addition are over GF(21). 
I'hc length of the I.FSR is 17. %%ith every register containing one %%ord, resulting in an 
internal memory of 544 hits. The contents of LFSR at time t is called the state of the 
[[SR and is denoted by a vector S 
Sr 	(A't..1',. /..1'T.......VO !b) 	(l f,,/ /,1. ......l,i 
[he next state of the I.I SR is calculated by shilling the previous state one step. and 
calculating a new word st .,- as a linear combination of the words in the I•[SR. The 
word s .17is calculated as IbbIlo\rs: 
.Si . / , - Si . 15 	S, j 8 a 	 Si . 
With a being a constant 
4.1.1.2 Non-Linear Function (NLF) 
I he non-linear function plays a vital role in strengthening the security of SOUI.R 
family by deterring the various attacks, that linear feedback and stuttering arc 
susceptible to. [he purpose of the N1,1- is to disguise the linearity in the I.I-SR stream. 
Alter ever\ cycle of the I.I SR. the Nl.I' combines %%ords from the register in a non-
linear function: the outputs Ibrm the NI .I stream r, 
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The Non-Linear Function (NI,F) at any instance of time t, combines Five values 
denoted s.s, I Sl d,s„. 12,A n ih, from certain positions of LNSR state, using a technique 
involving the rotation of partial sums and calculates one output, called v,. this output 
can be written as 
v,=((f(s,E s„ia) ]s:,,i s„6) e K) s,.0  . [1-TR001 
In above equation. K is a key dependent constant used in t-class and succeeding 
ciphers of family and is derived immediately after the secret session key is loaded, 2 
denotes addition moduto23 , c represents bitwise XOR and [is a non-linear fimction. 
The function J serves three purposes [G102j. Firstly, it removes the linearity in the 
least significant bit and adds significant non-linearity to the remaining hits. Secondly, 
it ensures that the addition of ro and r16 does not commute with the addition of r, and 
re Thirdly it ensures that every bit of the output of the NLF depends on every bit of r0 
and rig. XORing the value of Konst into the NLF has two purposes. firstly, it 
increasing the complexity of any attack (excluding exhaustive key search) as there arc 
now 216 possible NIP functions. Secondly, the Konst is XORcd (rather than added) 
so as to lower the probability of the addition of ri} commuting with the addition of r 
and r,,. there is still a small probability that the operations will commute, but this 
probability is low and relies on the value of Konst. 
[he interior design of the function jused in case of SORER-t16 and SODP.R-t32 of is 
pictured in Figure 4.21ROS398]. First the input is partitioned into a high part 
containing the S most significant bits, and a low part containing the remaining bits. 
[he high part addresses an S13OX with W bits of output. 'fhc 8 most significant bits 
are directly taken as the f-function output, whereas the least significant part of the 
SROX output is first XORed to the low part from the input. 
- 
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W -bit Input 
Partition Input 
8-bids 	
j 	
W- 8 bits 
I 
SROX 
W- 8 bits 
Combine w-bits of output 
Figure 4,2; The structure of the f 
function in SO11ER-t16 and SOBER-t32 
4.1.1.3 Stuttering 
Stuttering has been considered as the most ad-hoc part of the design of the SOHhR 
fill ciphers FROS398I, but still appears in almost every variant ofS013P:R except 
SOB' 128 and Doers the bust increase in security. II introduces irregular decimation 
in the output produced by the NLP to avoid the reconstruction of the state particularly 
by correlation attack. In these implementations, occasional words of nonlinear output 
are used to determine the inclusion of other words in the output stream. When the 
generator is started, the first output word is taken to he used as a stutter control word 
(SCW)I13CL03). Each stutter control byte is broken into pairs of bits called dibits. 
with the (east significant pair of bits being used first. I he dibits provide the cipher 
with iitstructions regarding how many times to cycle the LtSR, whether to output an 
NI,F utpul, and how this value is included in the key stream. When all dibils in the 
SCW have been used, the LYSR is clocked once and a new SCW is read from the 
output of the NLF. 
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[here are (( it posst le values for each of the two-hit stutter ccmtrc(s(ltOS004 
Fhese determine the output from the stream generator as foll)ws: 
(0, 0) - I he register is cycled but no output is produced. 
(0, 1) The register is cycled, and the nonlinear Output XOR the constant C becomes 
the output of the generator. the register is then cycled again. 
(1. 0) [he register is cycled t% ice, and the (second) nonlinear output becomes the 
output of the generator. 
(I, I ) The register is cycled, and the nonlinear output XORed with the complement of 
constant C becomes the Output of the generator. 
4.1.2 Comparative Analysis of Sober Family Members 
I his section Carries out an analyses based on the design tcatures like kcti mg the 
stream cipher. byte order considerations. memory requirements, key strength. 
pul)nomials used. I.I SR o%cr (il:  (2"). and security issues 
4.1.2.1 Keying the Stream Cipher 
a) l3 tc Order Considerations 
SOI3kR.S0131R 11.516.s,2.SO131:l t-8.t-l6 and 1-32 utilize native processor 
operations on integer data items. but are expected to accept keys which are simpl\ 
strings of bytes. and to produce a stream of bytes as output for encryption 
purposes.jROS00I. To ensure compatibility bcmeen implementations running on 
different processors, a translation between native byte ordering and external byte 
ordering is necessary. Since all intcrnet standards are defined using "big-endian" 
byte orderingl111•:1.8 1. in which the most significant byte of a multi-byte 
quantit\ appears first in memory. this is hat is chosen for 
ti()131:.R.SOl31-:12II,S 16.5 2.SOI31:.R t-8.16. 
On "fittic-Indian" machines. the key and the words of the output stream must be byte 
reversed before being loaded or XORcd into the buffer, respcctivcl. 
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In contrast S( )131R- 	is entirely based on 32-bit word operations internally 
1118032J. but the external interface is specified in terms of arras of' bytes. 
Conversion het\%cen 4-byte chunks and 32-bit \\ords is done in "little-Indian" fashion 
irrespective of the byte ordering of the underlying machine. I his is a break \%ith the 
tradition of previous members of the SOB3LR family 
b) Key Loading 
the SOI3ER family ciphers are designed for applications in \%ircicss telephony. Loss 
of' synchronization haunts such applications a great deal. In order to avert such 
calamitous loss, one solution adopted by GSM system is to have each encrypted frame 
implicitly numbered with a frame key. and the stream cipher re-keyed for each frame 
with the secret session key and the frame kce. S0131:It supports such a two tier kc\ ing 
structure I ROS 1981. S I6 shares this two-level keying structure. S32 was not designed 
to support such a two tier keying structureIROS001: All t-class ciphers and SOB1•:R 
I28 have been designed to support the two-tiered keying structure in addition to the 
standard mode of operationl1lRO32j. The cipher is keyed and re-keyed h\ using 
operations that transform the values in the register under the influence of' key material. 
Two principle operations are employed: 
Include( X ): adds the word X to r1 modulo 2" :w-{8.16.32}. 
1)ifuscO: cycles the register and this operation clocks the register. obtains the value 
h' XORing the output of' the NI l 	ith r.,. Table 4.1 gives a comparison of key 
Icngth. hit operation and memor\ requirements in bytes of dificrcnt variants of 
S()I31:R family. 
Table 4.1: The Key length, bit operations and memory requirements of s()I3N;l2 family 
ciphers 
Cipher 	 ss -bit 	 Max Key Length 	Mcmor (hvtes) 
Operation 	(hits) 
S()I3ER 	 8 128 	 54 
S-16 	 16 	 194 	 108 
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S-32 32 256 78 
SOBER t8 8 64 54 
S0131:11 t 16 16 128 105  
SO13FR t32 32 256 i 	210 
SOBER 128 32 128 140 
4.1.2.2 Linear Feedback Shift Register over GF (2") 
I he I.I SRs of SO13l-.R. S0131-:IZ-I1. SOI31-.R-t8 are over GI 	(2"): The LFSRs of S16. 
SOBF IZ-t 16 	arc 	ewer GF 	(2')I ROSOO I. 	The 	I.FSRs 	of S32. 	SOI3FR-t 32, 	and 
SO13I:IZ-128 are over GI 	(2). The length of S32 is 9 stages and the lengths of the 
others arc all 	17 stages. 	Fable 4.2 compares the irreducible polynomials used by 
SOI3f.IZ tamilr ciphers and their hexadecimal representation 
Table 4.2: The irreducible polynomial used in SOBER family ciphers 
Cipher 	Irreducible Polynomial Hexadecimal 
Representation 
SOBER 	 V 	\, 	X' 	X1 0xl41) 
S-16 	 X ;~' . .V" . .V' 	X 	X' - Y' 	X - X 	I 0x1501)7 
S-32 	 \`' 	r A' 	l"1( • .Yc 	1 /(A~ • X • X, 	l) (Ix 165656565 
SOBER tt{ 	 l' 	k 	X' 	k"" 	I Ox 141) 
S(iw i 	116 	t lr 	X'•' • .l' 	+ X • ,l'r • .11..Y + .~'+ I Ox 15(11)7 
SORER t32 	~ 	.,I 	1.16 . 	. 	l)(,11 	X5 	.X ii) Ox165656565 
SO13ER 128 	 .1i? 	.X~ s • ~ h 	- 	u i 	(lx 17(11) 
-A 
I.FSIZ of various variants (if SO13l•:IZ are updated according to the recurrence relation 
sho n in table 4.3: 
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Fable 4.3: The feedback function of SOIWR family ciphers 
;'ipher 	Feedback Function 
SOBER 	I 	 S, 	 15$ s,. s$99J3, 
i-l6 	 S,,. j ' l3/216[E,r,, f;$s,,..r ®673C16~s„  
i-32 	 - 	 S, -, 632  PDA16®s„- r®?H7+'„ 
4O131:12 is 	 S,,., 	('l,.'160.s•,f /s®S,,..,$6316f~1s,, 
iO13F,R t16 	 S,,.I, E38216aJ.s,,. is$ ,, , .i$67/3('16w„ 
iO131.I1 t32 	 S,,. i - s,,. /5$.S„ r®C21)R2AA3/6~s,, 
iORE.R 128 	j 	 Sn 17 S,. is®s„ .r69(,LY',, 
1.2 Py family of'Stream Ciphers 
l'hc stream cipher P) (Roo) analyzed in this chapter was one of these candidates in 
profile I stream cipher category. After initial analysis of less than a year 28 ciphers 
~~•crc promoted in phase 2 including P. But some attacks were reported against it and 
.o improve these shortcomings a new version Pypy was introduced but that was also 
:usccptiblc to some attacks. the cS I'IRI.AM committee eliminated P) from phase 3 
but the report I1:S'1121 says that "Ny and its variants demonstrate a promising 
approach that might ollcr exceptional performance. l;nfortunately. hoevcr. there is 
sufficient analysis (l()KM07. PPSO5. and WP06J to suggest that the submitted 
versions of the cipher demonstrate a weakness in the design.” 
to overcome the deficiencies in the previous variants of the Py. the designers had 
tweaked these ciphers and proposed three ne ciphers IVy, 1 Pypy. I Py6. l;vcn 
though these tweaked variants have solved the problems of the previous known 
attacks against this family but new attacks were also reported against these new 
variants. In a new proposal Paul. Preneel & Sckar have introduced two new variants 
R('R-32 and RCR-64 and claimed it to he secure against any attack known for Py and 
its previous variants. But most of the claimed attacks against tweaked versions i.e. 
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P>. I Pypv&. 'I Pyv6 were claimed as non-attack by the designers of these ciphers. 
This chapter has attempted to analyze the design and security specifications of P) 
cipher and its variants to assess the reliability of these ciphers and get a better 
understanding for the design of'a stream cipher that is more secure as well as efficient. 
This chapter studies the design specifications, implementation details and security 
attacks of P\ cipher and its variants. 
4.2.1 Design Specifications of l'y family 
I he main component in the design of 1'v (Roo) familN ol'ciphers is rolling arrays. A 
rolling array is vector hose units are cyclically rotated and every rotation shifts its 
entries h\ one location. Some additional basic operations are performed as part of' the 
array rotation. A very important propert\ of the rolling array is that if'the same entry 
is accessed in two consecutive steps then a different content will be generated. This 
propert\ is very useful for increasing the speed of' mixing the internal state of the 
cipher. In the Py (Row) stream cipher and its other variants two rolling arrays have 
been used and both affect each other by their operation. Permutation and swap 
operations are performed on one array and then the update operation accesses the 
other entries. One rolling arra\ is a permutation P of all 256 hie values and other is 
an array Y of 260 words of 32 bits I  I3S05  I.  All the entries are rotated and oldest 
entries is updated. In this way indirect access is performed that add a large amount of 
complexity to the mixing: process that make it complex for a cryptanalyst to follow. 
4.2.1.1 	l'v (Iloo) 
Pv (pronounced Ren) is a synchronous stream cipher designed in response to 
cS'I'Rl. \M project call. I he main component ofthis cipher design is rolling arrays. It 
also uses various other ideas from many other ciphers. like permutation and variable 
rotation. In some extent Py is similar to R('4 as it also uses the technique of random 
scuffle I PPSO5 . In Pv all the array elements arc also rotated in every round. The main 
strength of this cipher Py is its speed. It is 2.5 times lastcr than RC4. It takes less than 
2.9 ("scles/hvte on Pentium-III. Py is a stream cipher designed especially for very fast 
and secure encryption. It is intended for use ith keys of upto 256 hits (32 bytes) and 
initial \ ectur (IV) of upto 128 hits (16 bytes) but it can also he used with large keys of 
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upto 256 bytes and IV sizes upto 64 bytes. i'he stream generated for a given pair of 
ke and IV is restricted to length of upto 264 bytes. 
In the design of P\ cipher two rolling arrays have been used. One array 1' is of 256 
bytes that contains a permutation of all the values from 0.... to 255 and second array 
Y is an array of site 260 here each word is of 32 bit and are indexed as -3.... to 
256. Both the arras rotated in each step of cipher and two output words computed 
~ 13S0 j. This word is updated by mixing two words of Y into it. where to words are 
indircctl\ selected from P and then variable rotation is performed on it. In this way the 
word is rotated by a number of bits that is calculated from another entry off'. 
Attacks on P' 
Paul. Preneel and Sekar found a statistical bias in the distribution of the Output words 
that can be used to construct a distinguisher that can work with 283.2 random 
keys/IVs IPPS061. In that attack. the key stream can be distinguished from random 
with 289.2 outputs. Later on Crowley improved this attack by using hidden Marko' 
model by a factor of about 216 in the number of samples ICR0061. 13} using this 
model a distinguishing attack can be made against Py with 272 given bytes of output. 
4. Pv6Py6 is a variant of P with reduced internal state size. In this smaller variant of 
P. the value of the Permutation P is reduced to a smaller site of 64 and Y to 68 
entries. [he card site of Y remains unchanged to 32 hits. This variant was proposed 
to achieve fast initialization with the speed remains the same as the speed of 1'y. I'hc 
smaller size of internal states allows a much faster key setup and IV setup that is very 
attractive for encryption of short streams. This variant has smaller rolling arrays. thus 
its key setup and IV setup are much faster than of Py. and take 796 and 1464 cycles. 
respectively. The total number of cycles required by the key and IV setups is thus 
smaller than the key setup of RC4. and the stream generation is about 2.5 times faster 
than RC4.Py6 differs from Py in the implementation that in this variant the difference 
free set had to be replaced by a difference free set modulo 64 and modulo 68. 
lh owever, there cannot be 10 numbers in such a difference free set, thus in this variant 
the difference free set contains only the six values that are used as indices to the array 
P 13S05 J. Also. in the generation of the permutation N the internal permutation cannot 
be used, thus it is removed from one location, and some rotations by eight hits are 
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replaced by rotations by six hits in order to ensure full mixture of the data. As the 
indices in this variant are shorter, the length of the generated streams is restricted to 
240. 
Attacks on Py6 
As the design of Py6 is same as the Py the attacks which are applicable to Py are also 
applicable to Pv6. Iixcept those attacks that are applicable to Py, distinguishing 
attacks were reported against Pyti with 268data and comparable time by Paul and 
I'rcnccl F PP061. 
4.2.1.2 I'ypy (Roopy) 
Distinguishing attacks were reported against Py by exploiting some statistical bias in 
the design of Py. to overcome these shortcomings in the design of Py, a new 
improved version Pypy was proposed by the designers of Py. It takes every second 
word of the stream of Py (starting from the second word) and half of the outputs are 
discarded. i.e., the first output of the two outputs at each step is discarded I3S061 
though, slower than P. it is still about 1.5 times faster than RCA. Pypy follows the 
same structure, as of Py in terms of key setup, IV scuip and implementation. The only 
difference being that the first output of the two outputs at each step is discarded 
Attacks onPypy 
The IV setup of I'y and Pypy are same. Wu and Prenccl showed that there is serious 
flaw in the IV setup of Py and Pvpy. In these ciphers, two key streams can be 
identical for every 216 f V's for IV's with special difference. In this way key recovery 
attacks can be made against the ciphers Py, Pypy, Py6 with chosen IVs I1113061. This 
attack was subsequently improved by Isobe et al. They showed that 128 bit key can be 
recovered with a time complexity of 2' 11OK071. To overcome the deficiencies in 
the design of Py, Py6, and Pypy, the designers withdrew them and introduced three 
new modified or tweaked version of these ciphers that are TPy, Tpy6 &TPypy. 
4.2.1.3 'IPy, Tpyb &TPypy 
I Py, I py6 & fPypy came into existence as a result of major limitations of equivalent 
IV's found in all members of Py family. TPy. Tpy6 &TPypy are the enhanced 
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versions of Py, Py6 & Pyp). Since the kc) setup & stream generation remain 
unaltered in the nc design. both characteristics are same as of the previous version 
J13S07J. the tweaked IV setup may be very slightly slower than the original, as the 
modification is very small. The authors of Py claimed that there are no equivalents 
IVs in Py. When looking at the IV setup, and considering the two loops that mix the 
IV into 1:IV (on %%hich the ne attack is based). it becomes clear that the authors of 
P. when tried to improve the IV setup, added the second loop in order to in ix the IV 
better into the internal state. I lowever. this extra mixing was it poor choice, as if'only 
the first loop as proposed. the IV setup would not ha\c the equivalent IVs problem. 
o overcome this problem the IV setup of all the three members of the Py family were 
tweaked. In the tweak of Py and Pypy. the second mixing loop of' the IV were 
modified such that it will not lead to equivalent IVs, by ensuring that it is invertible 
(follo ing the suggestion of 1 PPS061). in a way that prefer over removing this second 
loop. I'he final loop of the IV setup was changed slightly, also in order to ensure 
invertibility. In I'Py6. unlike in Py6, the I.IV rolling array is also doubled in size to iv 
sizcb*2. As a result. it limits the keys oi"1'Py6 to be up to 64 bytes. and the IVs to be 
up to 32 bytes (both are larger than the minimal and recommended sites). 113S071 
Attacks on Th, 'I'py6 & TPvpy 
In ISI'P07l I Sckar. Paul and Preneel published distinguishing attacks on P\. Pypy. 
IN and IP\p) \%ith data complexities 2 x each. In ISPP072I Sekar. Paul and 
Preneel showed nc\\ weaknesses in the stream ciphers I P) and N. Exploiting these 
weaknesses distinguishing attacks on the ciphers arc constructed \%here the best 
distinguisher requires 21` '' "data and comparable time. In J SPP073 I Sckar. Paul and 
Preneel mounted distinguishing attacks on fPy6 and Py6 with 2 I `'data and 
comparable time each. Further in ISPP074J Sekar. Paul and Prenccl detected related-
key weaknesses in the Py family of ciphers including the strongest member I I'ypv. 
Under related keys the shown that a distinguishing attack on I'P\py with data 
complexity 2'`"' which is lower than the previous best known attack on the cipher by 
a factor of 2. It was also shown in this paper that the above attack also works on the 
other members I'Py. Pypyand Py. Later in 113S081. the designers of P) Cipher have 
denied the attacks can FP \ family especially on I'Pypy. 
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4.2.1.4 RCR-32 & RCR-64 
In the process of getting a secure cipher Paul, Preneel & Sekar proposed two new 
ciphers RCR-32 and RCR-64 that are derived from TPy & IV respectively- The 
key and IV setup ol'the RCR-32 and RCR-64 are identical with TPy and -1Pypy. I he 
only change in the design of these ciphers have been made that variable rotation of 
quart it' s is replaced with constant rotation IS PP074]. 
Attacks on RCIi-32 & RCR-64 
These new variants were claimed to be secure from all attacks that have been made 
against previous version of the Py family. Any attack has not been reported against 
these ciphers till date. 
Table 4.4 gives a comparative study of encryption speeds of all variants of Py stream 
cipher and fable 4.5 presents the complexities of attacks on various variants of Py 
stream cipher. 
'fable 4.4: Speed of Py and its variant Ciphers in cycles/bytes on Intel Pentium- 
III processor 
Py & "I'Py 2.80 
Py6 
&.1,Py6 
2.80 
Pypy PYPY & Pypy 4.58 
	__....-, 
RCR-32    4.45 -- -----' 
RCR-64 2.70 
RC4 	 --- 7.30 
Fable 4.5: Attacks on the Py-family of stream Ciphers 
t It shows the complexity of attacks and X Jenotcs that the attack does not work) 
Attacks Py6 1'S Pypy 1'I'J'6 TPy TPyPy j 
X _ 	X _ 2 	- __- - X 
Crowley 	X 	2 X X 2 X - 
Ljicneet_Paul 	r" 	X 2aa6 X X X'~ 
Isobc ct al. 	X  X 
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Sekar et al. X ! 	228  X f 	
2781 -- 	i 2281-- 
Sekar et al. X 22 	X X x 
Sekar et al. 2
~,:' X — 	X • -za r> + 	X X 
Sekar ct al. X 21 	2193 X ! 	2 ;' 21 	7 
PrLnLLl\I X j 	2' s` 	2`~ X X X 
I hough Py and its variants used a promising approach that can deliver high 
performance, analysis have proved susceptibility of these ciphers towards differcnt 
attacks like distinguishing attack. key recovery attack and chosen IV attack. I Nypy is 
considered to be strongest candidate over the entire lamily. F.ven though security 
claims have been made by Prenecl et al I SP073I and Sekar et al. I SP0751 against 
"1•Pypy but the designers have already specified that this cipher can only he assumed 
secure for 2`"' bytes of key stream and hence Counter claim by designers to prove it 
secure is also satisfactory 1135081. No other attack which is more powerful than these 
attacks and of less complexity has been reported against "l Pypy till date. Therefore the 
I'Pypy can be treated as secure cipher till any other claim or cryptanalysis comes 
against it. 
Analysis of Nonlinear feedback shift register (NLFSR) based 
Stream ciphers 
[his Section of the chapter gives a detailed discussion of various NI [SR based 
stream ciphers and presents a comparative analysis of' these ciphers. 1)ificrent ciphers 
analysed include I)R 1GO\ stream cipher. NI,Sv2 and GRAIN-128 stream ciphers. 
4.3 DRAGON stream cipher 
K. Chen, M. I lenricksen. W. Millan. J. Fuller. L. Simpson, F. Dawson. I1. Lee and S. 
Moon developed a 32-bit word based stream cipher called Dragon ICII1;04I. It is 
based on a non-linear lcedhack shill register in conjunction with a non-linear filter 
function with memory to produce kcystrcam in blocks of 64 hits. Dragon can he 
executed either with a key and IV-site of 128 bits or a key and IV-sire of 256 hits. 
[he nonlinear state update function. which is called the function F. takes six state 
words (192 bits) as input and produces six words (192 hits) as output. Among the 
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output words ol'!• function. two words are used as new state words and two words are 
produced as a kcystream. 
4.3.1 Specification of Dragon 
I)rag n stream cipher is constructed using a single word based 1024-hit nonlinear 
feedback register (\I.I SR). a nonlinear state update function. and a 64-bit internal 
memory. Dragon is implemented with to sires of' key and initialization vector (IV) 
of the size of' 128 or 256 bits and produces a 64-bit output per round. The nonlinear 
state update function F. takes six 32-hit words (1 92 bits) as Input and produces six 32-
bit cards (192 bits) as output. I igure 4.3 gives a detailed structure of function /• 
and denotes the input words as ; a. h, c, d. c. f; and the output words as ; a' W.  
c'. d'. C. f'; . Among the Output \%ords of F function, two \cords arc used as new state 
\surds and to \cords arc produced as a kc\stream. I he function F has to 
component functions G and !! constructed by using two cxplicitl\ non-linear Y > 32 
S-boxes. %\hich arc called as SI and S2. Suppose that the 32-hit input x is split into 
four b\ tes such as x 	xO x l x2 x3 where xi denotes a single byte and denotes a 
concatenation. I?ach byte xi is passed through an 8 x 32 S-box and the four 32-hit 
Outputs are combined using hinarN addition. 
A network of modular and binary additions is used for diffusion in the I: function. It 
can he divided to three parts: prc-mixing. Substitution. and post-mixing. In Figure 4.3. 
represents exclusive-or (XOR) and 	represents addition modulo 2;~. 
El- 
H -,v-  - -- 
1 
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Fig 4.3: Keystream Initialisation and generation 
Dragon can be used with two diffcrcnt key and initialisation vector lengths: 128-bit 
and 256-hit. I'he 256-hit key and initialisation vector is denoted as K and IV 
respectively and the 128-hit key and initialisation vector is denoted as k and iv 
respectively. Dragon has a simple keying (and rcke% ing) strategy using the key and 
the publicly kno n initialisation vector. The 1024-bit internal state is divided into 
eight I28-bit words. labelled WO to V 7and is initially filled by concatenating the key 
and the initialisation vector with their hitwise suet and its complement such that W 
K K =IV K ® IV 11 IV. I'hc state initialisation process makes extensive use of the 
I: function and involves 16 iterations of the I` function. I'he use of existing 
components for both initialisation and keystream generation simplifies analysis and 
increases implementation efficiency. 
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Figi  4.4: Initialisation of Dragon 
Dragon possesses a M.PSR of 1024 bit size, which is divided into thirty-two 32-bit 
values. 13,. 0 < i<31. At each round six words from the internal state are used as input 
to the F function. I he words of the first round are taken from the positions 0. 9.16, 19. 
30 and 31. which form a Full Positive Difference Set (FPDS)[HEN05]. Furthermore, 
the 64-bit memory counter M acts as a counter during keystrearn generation. Pic 
counter M is initialized during the initialization process. Lach round ofthe keystrearn 
generation results in output o164 hits of keystream called k and t3 and M are updated. 
4.3.2 Security of Dragon 
Englund and Maximov in I?MI15I describe a distinguishing attack on Dragon. which 
is supposed to be the first proposed attack on Dragon stream cipher. According to 
Englund and Maximov. "I two versions of a distinguishing attack on Dragon were 
found. The first scenarios requires a computational complexity of O(2) and needs 
mcmnr. only O(2'-). I lowever. the second scenario has a lower time complexity 
around 0(2I).  but requires a larger amount of memory O(2L"')_ These attacks show 
that Dragon does not provide full security and can successfully he broken much faster 
than the exhaustive search. when a key o1256 bits is used. 
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In response to this attack, the designers of Dragon in I UAW 121 state that the attack 
mentioned in JEMO5J is only possible if' the designers' restriction on key stream length 
is relaxed to allow the generation of enormous amounts of kcystrcam under a single 
key-IV pair. The amount of kevstreanm required is 2y times the 2'" hit maximum 
recommended. 
Dragon is believed to possess good statistical properties as it has passed all pertinent 
statistical tests provided by CRYPT-XI l I1)I.W971. Based on the size of its \1,1 SR and 
('01INI'l;R. Dragon is expected to have a have a period of about 2'` -` hits. Also 
Dragon is designed to avoid weak keys. I'he internal state is a non linear feedback 
shift register that avoids fixed point through its use of a counter. "l herclurc all-zero 
state. which is a problematic in man\ LFSR based stream ciphers. does not produce 
an\ weak keys. 
4.4 Grain 128: 
Specific cr\ptographic primitives were considered essential ['or hard~%arc based 
applications where resources are limited. eS l'I(I:AM called for submissions in two 
categories, hardware and soft are. Grain 128 as specifically designed for 
cS I RF.AM IRM08I submission in hardware profile and it as selected in the final 
phase of'cS I IRI:AM competition. 
Grain VO II IJM05I was originally designed for the cS l'RFAM submission but some 
weaknesses were Found in the design. A distinguishing attack using the concept linear 
sequential circuit approximation was reported by Khaxaci. IIassanzadch and Kiaci 
1 KSI 1051. l3arbcin. Gilbert and Maximov I 13GM061 also mounted a key recovery 
attack. In vie 	of these two attacks, the original design slightly modified and 
feedback polynomial of \l SR and keystream function was modified and designers of 
Grain presented the new Grain cipher as Grain V 1. 
But even after these modifications, the design was attacked by Cannierc. Kucuk and 
Prenccl ICKP08J by exploiting the weakness in initialization algorithm. I'his attack 
was Further strengthened by Lee et al. jI.Y081 by exploiting the same weakness of' 
related key and proposed a key recovery attack against (rain VI.  A new attack. called 
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Dynamic Cube attack I DIS 1121 has been also reported against the Grain VI that can 
recover 80 bits key fully. 
In view of these attacks and due to rapid advancement of hardware technology, the 
possibility of exhaustive key search attack on 80 bit primitives in the near future, a 
now version that uses 128 bit key called Grain 128 was introduced by the designers of 
Grain. 
4.4.1 Design Specifications of (:rain 128: 
The basic building blocks of all the variants of Grain stream cipher are same. Grain is 
a bit oriented synchronous stream cipher. It uses one NFSR and one LPSR with a 
filter function to combine the output of these shift registers.'I'he general Structure of 
Grain has been shown in figure 4.5. 
	
g(x) 	 f(x) 
NFSR 	N 	_ 	IFSR 
h(x) 
I Input 	 4 Inputs 
Figure 4.5: General structure of (;rain Stream 
In case of Grain 128. ATSR and LI'SR arc of 128 hit length each has been used. 
These two registers provide an internal state of 256 bits. 
Feedback polynomial ol'I.FSR 
.f(x) - 
j 	X90. X 12l 
1 	
, x 118 
eedbackdpolynomial ofNFSR 
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g(Xx _] I 	,2 4 x3 4 , x12 , x02 y X I2 N + X 44x66 f _ x61X135 , X,3X6] X69X101 	r80X8R I _ 
%110X111 	zdlSy l l? 
'I he filter function is 
h(X) x01 -r sax? xmxs ' xczi -- loxas 
Where the variables xo to xe respectively correspond to the tap position b,-12, s,+a, sl+ia, 
5i+2o, q,+vs, s+42, s1+6o, s,-7y and s.-or. 
The k lpystream function is defined as 
When A = {2.15, 36, 45, 64. 73. 89} 
4.4.2 Key Initialization of Grain: 
The drain cipher is initialized before generating the key streams. The 128 bit secret 
key is filed in the NFSR and first 96 bits or I.FSR are loaded with the IV [11M08]. 
The remaining bits of LFSR are padded with all ones. The cipher is clocked 256 times 
beforq actually generating the kcystream. The clocking flush out all the values 
previously stored in the shift registers and only random values are stored in the two 
shift registers.' I' he key initialization of Grain has been shown in figure 4.6. 
Some (weakness in key initialization of Grain 128 was found by Kucuk IKUC06I and 
in view of these observations, the padding by all ones was changed and only last 31 
bits of LFSR were filled with ones and rightmost bit was filled with zero to overcome 
this weakness. 
b(r) 	 f(x) 
Input 
-: 
Analysis of existing stream ciphers 
Figure 4.6: Key Initialization of Grain 
4.4.3 Attacks on Grain 128: 
he design principles cat (irain V I and Grain 128 are same except that Grain V I is a 
81) hit cipher and grain 128 is a 128 bit stream cipher. The attacks which are 
applicable to (;rain V I are also applicable for grain 128 due to this similarity in 
design. 
I cc et al. K I.Y081 proposed a key recover\ attack that requires 226.59 chosen IVs. 
211.39 kc\ stream hits and 227.01 computations to recover the whole kc\ oF 128 hits. 
A fault attack that induces 24 consecutive faults in the I,FSR to recover the 128 kcv 
'~ ithin a span of a l'e minutes 'as proposed by I3criati et al. I BA091. A fault attack 
based on \ISR as proposed by Karrcakar and Chomodhory I KSC III that requires a 
number (11 faults ranging from 56 to 256 in \I SR and requires a time complexity of 0 
(22 1 and space complexity of 0 (2.2) to recover the secret kcv. The dynamic Cube 
attack was also proposed against Grain 128 by Dinur and Shamir I l)IS I 1 I that can 
reduce the key recovery time in comparison to exhaustive key search attack by a 
factor H'~" 
4.5 \L.SV2: 
\I,SV2 1I IP07j is the most advanced member of the SO131•:R family of stream cipher 
It is a modilicd and advanced version oC Non Linear Sober (NI.S). NI.S was 
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submitted to cS'FRN AM in both the profiles I and 2 but two major attacks were 
reported against this design. A linear distinguishing attack was proposed by Chou and 
Picprryk that was based on a linear approximation of NFSR and NI,I . l'he second 
attack called crossword puzzle attack was also proposed by Clio and Picprryk. It was 
an improved attack based on the first attack. In vie%% ol'thesc attacks and suggestions. 
an improved version of NLS I 1P06J called NI.SV, %gas presented by the designers of 
NI.S. the Konsi variable is periodically updated in comparison to NI.S where Konst 
remain constant during kc\stream generation and dependent on the kc.. 
\I.SV, is a software oriented s}nchronous stream cipher that also pros ides message 
authentication functionality and it was submitted in eS l REAM competition in profile 
IA category. NLSV, provides 128 hit sccurit\ and performs 32 hit operations similar 
to NI.S. 
4.5.1 IWSIGN SPECIFICATIONS OF NI.S%-2 
NI.SV, is very much similar to previous versions of SOI3LR f~►mil) ciphers SOI31:It 
128 and NLS except some changes but the design rationale is similar. In this section. 
the design specification of NI.SV2 has been discussed: 
4.5.2 Keystrcam Generation: 
[he ke stream is generated %\ ith the help of three components namcl\ nonlinear 
feedback shift register (NI.l'SR). it nonlinear filter (NI .F) and a counter. [he cipher is 
based on 32 bit operations and 32 hit sized words. 
At any time, the state of 	NFSR is denoted b S, 	(r~I01. r,I II ........... r,j 161) and its 
initial state is represented by So, — (rol01. rt,I I ........... rol 161). 
I'he update function of'N1 SR is represented by these equations: 
I. 	r,.'Ill 	r,4 i• 1 1, for 1 	0.1...........15 
2. r,, ,I 161 — /((rr401«<19) • (r,I 15 }<<<9) +- Konsl) ® r,141 
3. ii, 0 (modulo,J16). then 
a. r,.' 121 is modified by adding ! (modulo 23 2 ) 
b. Konst is changed to the output of NLF 
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c. 'The output of NIT at t 	is not used as a kevstream word, where /16 is 
a constant integer 2n  t l = 65537 
I he function f is defined as fiw) = S-Box (won ) e w where w(b) is the most 
significant 8 hits of 32 hit word w 
The output of the NFSR is fed to NLF to produce 32 bit output word denoted as V. 
I 
The NLF generates the output words as: 
V = NLF(S) - (r,[0I * r,l 161 1 8 111+r(r+ r [ 13])  ® (r1161 I Kunst) 
4.S.3 A'I TACKS ON NLSV2: 
Clio and Pieprzyk ICP0411 proposed Crossword Puzzle Attack on NLSv2 that 
requires 2'°  observations to mount the distinguishing attack by using a bias in the 
NFSR and combining with correlation between 29 and 30 bits of S-Rox. This 
distinguisher fails the claim of designers that at least 2N0 observations are required to 
mount a distinguishing attack. 
In fable 4.6, a comparative analysis of the performance of NLFSR based stream 
ciphers is presented. [hose values were calculated on a Pentium M machine with a 
processor speed of 1700MI IX and variant input values. 
'FABLE 4.6: Performance Analysis of NLSS12 Stream Ciphers 
Cipher K<y R Keystreum 	Keysr em 	I Keystrenm 	I  Memory rThrough 
Primitive setup 	encryption 	encrwpliun 	i Rrquir cments pul 
(4U nylcsl 	(576 nytn) i 
(in bytes) I,II 
128 128 4180.59 5.59 NISVT 777.31 103.51 2,196 
DHACU61 1113.98  83.20 - 
 
32.35 - 4,994 t 11.74 128 128 
GRAIN- 128 96 18.01 '59.54 33.67  256 	28.58 
'Is ' 
 
(" denotes hardware based stream cipher with a gate count) 
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In this chapter, an analysis of existing stream ciphers introduced in high profile stream 
cipher events like cS'I'RI:AM and NI;SSIF is presented. Ibis chapter discusses at 
length the members ol'SU131:R family of stream ciphers and performed an analysis on 
the basis of various parameters like byte order considerations, memory requirements. 
key strength. polynomials used. l}SR over (IF (2"), and security issues. Next an 
analysis of 1 y family of stream ciphers is presented. \khich include P stream cipher 
and it tweaked variations. The is eakcd versions were essentially introduced once the 
basic design as found susceptible to various cryptanalvtic attacks. the analysis is 
performed on the parameters like speed and complexities of various attacks on 
diflcrent variants of the I'y stream cipher. The second half of this chapter is dedicated 
to stream ciphers based on Nonlinear feedback shift register. 1)ifl'crcnt NI.I SR based 
stream ciphers discussed in this section include DRAGON, NLSv2 and GR.AI\-128. 
Dragon has been especially built for 32-bit architectures, also bearing in mind the 
importance of a strong and agile key schedule. Fhc cipher uses the minimum number 
of operations to ensure security, yet maintains a high level of efficiency. Dragon is 
believed to provide considerable level of security in terms of cryptanalylic attacks that 
have been reported on it. Nl.Sv2 is the nonlinear version of the SOI31:R family of 
stream ciphers and provides the additional Functionalit\ of Message Authentication 
capability (MAC). towards the end of the chapter. GRAIN-128 stream cipher is 
analysed. 
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BOKHARI: 
A New Software Oriented Stream Cipher 
I raditionally the realm of stream cipher design has focused on linear feedback shift 
registers (ITSRs). which are well studied and satisfy common statistical criteria but 
due to their inherent linearity, they become susceptible to several crvptanalytic 
attacks. the now stream cipher designs arc more inclined towards the Non linear 
feedback functions used in conjunction with Non-linear filter, Non-linearcomhination 
generator or irregular clocking to instill nonlinearity in the generated keystream. 
The 130KI IARI stream cipher is a new proposed stream cipher dedicated to software 
applications and is designed for a secret key that is up to 128 bits in length. The 
design is inspired by the design of both SORER-ti6 I FIR 121 which was one of the 
our candidates to make to phase II of NESSIri program and a reduced version of the 
well-known stream cipher DRAGON 1CIIE041. 130KIIARI is constructed from u 
non-linear Jeeclhock shU i register (NI.FSR) and a Non linear Filter (Nil) and 
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employs two functions /1 and J4 for the initialization and generation of key stream. 
Figure 5.1 shows a graphical representation of the structure of ROK I IARI stream 
cipher. 
Changeover from SOBER-t16 
I. '47tc BOKHARI stream cipher is based on a nonlinear feedback shift register 
l
NLI SR) instead of an LFSR used in SOBI3R-tl6 
2. Since the support for odd-length keys and initialisation vectors significantly 
complicate the code [HPR], ROKI IAR] is designed to only support keys and 
Vs that are multiples of 4 bytes in contrast to S(3I3FR-t16. which uses 
ultiples of 2 bytes. Keys and IVs of odd-length can always be padded by the 
iser. 
3. ` Konst" is set to a non-zero value during key loading, so as to avoid poor 
iffus ion. 
4. , tuttering has been removed. -though it added to the security but was 
omputationally expensive and exposed cipher to side channel attacks [HPRJ. 
5.1 Design Specifications 
13elKIIARI is a software oriented stream cipher constructed using an NLPSR, a Non-
linear filter and two state update functions fl and J2. In addition I30K1 IARI makes 
use of an S-Box designed by ]SRC. Following is a detailed description of various 
components of ROKHA RI stream cipher 
5.1.1 State Update Function 
BOKI IARI uses two state update functions fl and J2. I'hc . l function is a modified 
version of well-known stream cipher DRAGON and f2 function is similar to that used 
in SOBER-tl6. The fl function is used in key setup and is a reversible mapping o164 
bits (four 16-bit words) to 64 hits. It takes four 16-bit words as input and produces 
four 16~bit words as output. In Table I the input words are denoted {a, b. c. d} and 
the output words {a', b', c', d'}.'Ihefl function has four component functions denoted 
GI, G2, G3. G4 as described below. l'he G function provides algebraic completeness 
IKD791 and high non-linearity. 
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A network of modular and binary addltinns is used for diffusion in the fl function. It 
can be divided to three parts: pre-mixing. substitution, and post-mixing. 
TABLE. 5.1 : Structure of the fl function 
Input 	{a,b,c,d) 
Pre-mixing Layer: 
1. b=h®c: 	d=d®¢; 
2. a— ad; 	c=c®h: 
S-box Layer: 
3. d= dm rt(c), b= h ®c2(u); 
4. a— a m G(d): c= c W G4(b); 
Post-mixing Layer: 
5. b'=b &c'. 	d'=dTa: 
6. a'=a®d; 	c'= cmb: 
Output 	a'. b', c', d'1 
5.1.2 G Function 
I he G function is based on an Rxtb bit s-box which is a combination of skipjack s-
box and an s-box tailor designed by the information security Research Centre ([SRC) 
at the Queensland University of Technology 11IR12t. The ISR( S-box was 
constructed as eight mutually unconrolated, balanced and highly non-linear single bit 
function. all and at to form virtual 16x16 s-boxes. the G function consists of four 
components Gi. G2. G3 and G4as defined below. The 16-bit input is broken into two 
bytes (x - x011xl). Each byte is passed through an % x 16 s-box and the two 16-bit 
outputs combined using binary addition. 
G function is defined as: 
Gi(x) = all(xo) ®aL(xi) 
GO(x) -- aL(xnl eaH(xi) 
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(x) = all(xo) eab(xi) 
. Ix) — aL(xn) Sail (xi) 
Theft function is a part of Non Linear Filter (NI.F) of 130KIIARl. the /2 function 
has a 16 bit input word x = (xH!Ixl.). Here xl i and xl. represent the upper and lower 
bytes of 16-bit input word and'"I" denotes the concatenation of blocks. The s-box 
used is same as the one used i n /I 
5.1.31 itialization 
130KI IARI is keyed using a secret key and i-byte session key. the internal state is 
initially filled by the first 17 Iibonacci numbers by setting r0 = I and r, = I and 
computing r,= r I + r 2, for 2<= i<=I6. Fibonacci numbers are used only because of 
the ease of generation. the value of KONST is initially set to 0x6996 called 
INITKONST. The stale initialization makes extensive use oftheJl function. 
5.1.3.1 NLFSR 
130KI IARI uses an NI.I'SR of length 17 with each register element containing a 16-
bit word. The state of the NLFSR at time t is denoted v,,....s,.,F. "I'he new word is 
generated by shifting the previous state one step and updaling the state of the most 
cignificaht word according to the following equation 
S,+n=n rses,.4esJ 
I'he register is updated as follows: 
I~[OJ = R[ ); R[I] R[2];....:RJ 151— 12I 161: R[ I6)= S,,,, 
TheJl function used in NLFSR is the feedback function that takes four 16-bit words 
as inputiand produces four 16-bit words as output. In Fable 5.1 the input words are 
denoted {a, b, c, d} and the output words denoted as {a'. b'. c', d'}. I he input word 
a, b, c, are assigned the values at Tap position {0, 4, 15, 17) of the NLFSR 
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Figure 5. L: Graphical Representation of ROKFIARI Stream Cipher 
5.1.3.2 The Non-linear filter (N,F) 
At time I. the nonlinear filter (NI F) takes five words s,..r,, ,..c,.,1, ,c,.0 s„ tF from the 
NLPSR states and the constant Konslas the input and produces the output v,. the 
nonlinear filter consists of function f, three adders and XOR addition. The function 
/2 translates a single word input into a single word output. The output is generated by 
following equation 
v, ((J(s,~s,-is)Esnr®.r,, a)0Konrt)®.a, u 
the function /2 uses an S-box with an 8 hit input and a 16 bit output. The S-box 
which is a combination of skipjack s-box and an s-box tailor designed by the 
information security Research Centre (ISRC) at the Queensland University of 
Technology IIIR12I.The inputx to the function 12(x) is split into two strings. xIi and 
xL 
5.1.3.3 The S-Box 
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the S-13o.\ used in 130KI IARI stream cipher is a combination of the Skipjack S-box 
and an S-box tailor designed by Information Security Research Center (ISRC) at 
Queensland tlniversitN of l'cchnologN (QUT) and is employed in Functions /1 and /?. 
In case of function Jl. the 16 hit input 'a' is divided into t\\oo parts all and al..Sl3ox is 
Icd with an input all. I'hc eight most significant hits (MSf3s) of the Output of the 
SBox arc equal to the output of'the Skipjack S-box and the eight least significant bits 
(1.S13s) of the output of the Sl3oa are equal to the output of the S-box constructed by 
the ISRC. These two I6 bit outputs are then XORcd with each other and led back to 
function G. 
In case of function /2 used in the NIT  XLI part of the cipher, the 16 bit input is 
processed in the similar fashion as in /1. ('he only difference is that the eight MSBs of 
the Output o1 /2 is the output offthe skipjack S-box. while the eight LS13s are obtained 
by XO Rinp the eight bits of the output ot'the ISRC S-box with the I.Sl3s of the input. 
.4.1.4 Key stream generation 
Principle operation employed for key ink.: and rckeying of BOKI IARI arc: 
Include (X): I'his operation adds the word X to r. modulo 2"' 
Diffuse O: This operation clocks the register. obtains the Output v of the \I.F and 
replaces the value of rl4 (with the value of (rl4I® v). 
All keys must be multiple of  bytes in length: keylen is the length of the key in bytes. 
Fight 16-hit variables a, h. c. d a', b', c', d' act temporary placcholdcrs for register 
contents and outputs of function /l. I'his algorithm uses the values in "k I  J" to 
transform the current status of the register. 
Input = {l; (J, kev ien) 
1. Convert "kJ J" into k%\ I kcylcn/4 words and store in an array kw( (" of k'I 
"big-cndain" words: 
2. For each i. 0< i < (kwl-1). Include (kwj i 11 and apply Diffuse O. 
3. a-rn: b- r4: c= r;;: d roe r.,® r,;. 
4. 1 a', b', c, d'} - 11 (a. b. c. d). 
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5. rib=  
6. Apply Diffuse () 17 more times 
The register is initialized to first 17 Fibonacci numbers. 
ru  ri-1; r- r; 1 r,_2 	 for 2<i <16. 
And value of constant is set to the ward 0x6976 (called INI"FKONSf) in contrast to 
SOBER-tl6 that uses an all zero word as the initial value of Konst. the cipher 
applies Loadkcy (KID, t), which includes the session key bytes into the register and 
diffuses the information throughout the register. Again in 130KHARI, key/en is not 
included in the register as used in SOBER-t16; instead the function fl is used to 
ensure strong nonlincarity and distinct initial states. Once the key is diffused, the 
register is clocked and value of NLF is calculated. Kunst is set to this new value. [he 
values at NLFSR tap sets are stored in temporary placeholders (a. b. c and d} and 
passed to the function /1 that calculates the output by performing sufficient 
transformations of the values stored in these variables. The Diffuse () operation is 
applied 17 times in order to ensure that every hit of inputs effects every bit of 
resulting register state in a nonlinear fashion. If the cipher is going to he rekeyed for 
each of multiple frames, then the 17 word state of register (which is called the initial 
key state) can be saved at this point for later ux and the key discarded. I lowevcr for 
shorter keys, the key could be saved and the keying procedure repeated as necessary, 
trading additional computation time for some extra memory. If the cipher is not 
being used with a fame key. then the cipher produces a key stream with the register 
starting in the initial key state. I lowever, if the cipher uses a frame key, then the 
cipher first resets the register state to the saved initial key state and loads the n-byte 
frame keyfrarne10l. ... , frameln-1I using Input (frame[]. n). The state of the register 
following the re-keying is taken as the initial state and the cipher produces a key 
stream with the register starting in this state. 
5.2 Security Claims 
Any attack on 130KI [ARI stream cipher is believed to have a complexity greater than 
an exhaustive key search, though no mathematical proof of security is claimed. A 
brief Analysis of several attacks on I3OKI IARI stream cipher is mentioned below 
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5.2.1 Correlation Attack 
l'hc Iccdback function of the stream cipher is highly nonlinear through the use of 
SBox and a network mesh of addition and XOR preceded and followed by some pre-
mixing and post-mixing. [he nonlinearity of the feedback function and the selection 
of taps for the output filter function should adequately disguise any short distance 
correlations. The regular modification of the state should enhance this effect for long 
term correlations. 
5.2.2 Guess and determine attacks 
[he existence of Guess and Determine attack relics on the tap sets rather than 
individual NLF and NI.FSR operations. II1R03I [he taps selected for l3OKTInItI 
were such that they could resist Guess and Determine attacks. '[he tap set used in 
NLI'SR state update function 10. 4. 15, and 17} and Nonlinear filter O. 1. 6. 13. l6 
firm a full positive diffcrencc set (1 PI)S) that prevents Guess and Determine attacks. 
5.2.3 Distinguishing Attacks 
II' the output sequence of a stream cipher can be statistically distinguished from a 
random sequence, then the cipher is not strong enough for cryptographic applications. 
IMKIIARI is designed with complex initialisation and update function. It has no 
linear masking and therefore immune to this type of distinguishing attacks. ICI IJ021 
5.3 Weak Keys 
V1 eak keys are those keys that bypass some operations of the cipher. That is. the 
operations have no cflcct in the calculation of the feedback or the Output key stream. 
130K1 1,\R1 is designed to avoid weak keys. Since the internal state is an NI.FSR and 
value of KONST is set to non zero. therefore the all zero state is not is avoided. 
While it is easy to bypass the prc-mixing phase in a single iteration of the 1 function 
by having repetitive inputs such as all zeros or all ones. it is only possible for the first 
ol'thc 17 iterations of F in the key setup. Also. selected values are limited to the first 
four inputs of the 1: function, as the feedback input takes the value of final output 1"'. 
I'hc network of G and II functions ensure that the initial states which bypass the prc-
mixing phase cannot bypass any other operations in F. it is believed that the above 
design features provide a strong guarantee that there are rno weak keys for Dragon 
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5.4 Statistical Analysis 
Kc\ streams generated h\ UOK11ARI stream cipher have been anal)scd using \IS 
statistical suite I KI)79I. The N 1St test hatter y consists of 15 statistical tests. These 
tests check the input sequence for randomness, linear complexity. patterns and 
several other statistical properties exploited in crept- analytical attacks. No bias was 
found h\ an of the 17 tests included in the \ ISI suite. '[he key stream generated b\ 
BOKIIAR1 is reported to have properties of random bit streams and sufficient 
tolerance pertinent to these attacks 
FABLE 5.2 : Statistical Analysis 
Statistical test 
	
P-value (BOKIIAIRI) 
I:rcqucnc\ 	0.064721 
Block t'rcqucncy 0.515168 
Cumulative sum- Forward 0.371755 
Cumulative sum- l3ack%\ard 0.307124 
Runs 0.183759 
I.unt Runs of Ones (\1 	1000) 0.447910 
Rank 0.658201 
Spectral 1)I 	I 0.894390 
Non Overlapping 'l"cmplates (mm 	9. h 0000000001) 0.3 15012 
O crlapping I cmplatc 0.271304 
Universal (I. 	7. Q 	1280) 0.621864 
Approximate Entropy (in 	101 0.531830 
Random kxcursions (x 	I) 
Random I:xcursions Variant (x 	-I) 
0.871063 
0.418520 
Linear Complexity (M 	5001 0.741940 
Serial (m 	5) 0.428531 
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1?ti7 'Pests: 
130KI IARI Stream Cipher was tested on I:v f test suite and the recorded results are 
given in I able 5.3 and found totall\ unbiased. The tests were run on an input file 
containing 10400 samples and the output recorded that the input sequence was totally 
uncorrelated (-0.038915), entropy was recorded as 1.196567. which is optimum and 
arithmetic mean value of data byte was found to be 47.0118 which is totally random 
Table 5.3: ENT'l'est Results 
Jest 	 Result 
Entropy 
('ompression rate <Input file: 10400 bvtes> 
('hi square distribution <10400 samples> 
Arithmetic mean value 
Monte Carlo value 
Serial Correlation coefficient 
196567 
85% 
1224599 
47.0118 
4.00000 
-0.038915 
5.5 Memory requirements: 
Storage requirements include 1.024 b\1es to store a non-linear Sl3ox containing 256 
entries with each entry being a 16 hit word and 1,024 bytes to store the multiplication 
table with 256 entries, therefore a total of 2,048 bytes to store the internal state. 
Further storage of 140 bytes is required for the register of length 17 words and a four 
hytc Konst. f3OKI IARI has memory requirements totaling, 2.188 bytes. I his is 
suitable for even ver\ constrained environments. 
13OKI IAIZI stream cipher was run on an Intel (R) Core ('I'M) i7-3770 a 3.40 G1 Ii 
machine and compiled with gcc. The pert rmances \\ere obtained h\ taking the 
average of multiple runs. 
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TABLE 5.4: Performance of 130KIIARI on Intel-17 !ai3.411 GHz 
Encryption I hroufhput 
(in speed 	(Bytes per   
sees) 
(256 bits) 
0.007 --- ' 1334 
	
Primitive Key Iv cm 	P.ncryplinn F,neryplinn 
time 	speed (in speed (in 
(sees) 	sees) 	. sees) 
(64 bits) 	(128 bits) 
130KHARI 128128 i 0.0(185880.006 — 	00065 
In this chapter. a new software oriented stream cipher based on a secret key of length 
128 bits is presented.'I'his chapter gives an insight of the design details of IOKHARI 
stream cipher and assessment of its securip. It is believed that any attack on 
BOKIIARI has a complexity greater than exhaustive key search. fhis chapter also 
provides the statistical analysis of the new cipher and source code of I30KHARI 
written on a gee compiler can be found at the end of this thesis as Appendix 11. 
Conclusion 
Conclusion 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 0 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, the theory and practice of symmetric-key cryptology is discussed. 
Cryptographic algorithms provide mathematical tools for achieving several important 
security objectives in electronic corn nun ieations. Among the most important of these 
objectives is ensuring privacy of the message exchange. Privacy can he achieved by 
using both symmetric and asymmetric techniques. Though. in the areas where the 
highest level of security. high throughput capacity and low implementation costs are 
of the utmost importance, there is no alternative to symmetric systems and to stream 
ciphers. in particular. 
Stream Ciphers Were widely used without an' standard design. Now a days stream 
ciphers have attracted attention of scientific community and several attempts were 
made to standardise it but it these are still in nascent stage. For the construction of 
stream clphem. the toolbox of good. well documented strategies is not as rich as block 
ciphers. Most t lien ret i Ca  results arc concerned t4ith Boolean corn hifling functions or 
nonlinear filters. 
Cnrclusinn 0 
n this thesis, the basic design structure and philosophy of Stream cipher design is 
discussed and an analysis on the available stream cipher designs and crypranalvtic 
attacks on these ciphers is carried out. This whole investigation gives an insight about 
the state of the an of stream cipher design. tohich is a pre-requisite for efficient and 
ecure stream cipher design. 
lie rnain contribution of this thesis is a proposal of a new stream cipher named a 
'tROKHARI stream cipher" that has been successfully tested on different statistic 
t~sts and with the available knowledge of en pt analytical attacks and it has he 
I~Ibond to be secure against any such weakness. 
Future Work 
his work leaves room for interesting problems for future work. The usage of sh 
Ftey and IV makes BOKHAR] a good candidate to be used in constrained per 
devices. The integration of Message Authentication Code (MAC) in BOt 
y#ream cipher can be a vital enhancement to the existing design. MIAC 
i plemented in two phases: MAC accumulation and Mac finalisation. 
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/*«Bokhari.c source code in gcc compiler. 
@Faheem Masoodi 
#define N 17 
#define CONSTC 0x6996 
#define WORDSIZE 16 
#define WORD unsigned short 
/* multiplication tables */ 
#include "multab.h" 
#include "sbox.h" 
WORD Initial(N]; 	/* Initial contents of shift register -- key 
schedule */ 
WORD R[2*N]; 	/* Working storage for the shift register */ 
WORD konst; /* key dependent non-linear function */ 
WORD *rp; 	/* current offset in sliding window buffer */ 
/* external interface declarations */ 
void bokhari key(unsigned char key[], int keylen); 
void bokhari_genbytes(unsigned long frame, unsigned char buf[], 
int nbytes); 
/* 
* FOLD is how many register cycles need to be performed after 
combining the 
* last byte of key and non-linear feedback. 
#define FOLD N 	/* how many iterations of folding to do *, 
#define KEYP 15 /* where to insert key words */ 
#define FOLDP 4 	/* where to insert non-linear feedback */ 
#define INITKONST 0x6996 
/* end of bokhari header */ 
#define XOR LAYER(di, Si, d2, s2) 
dl = Si; 
d2 ~= s2; 
#define ADDLAYER(dl, sl, d2, s2) 
dl += Si; 
d2 += s2; 
#define SBOX LAYER(G, dl, Si, d2, 52) 
dl "= 01(sl); \. 
d2 A = G2(s2); 
#define bokhariUPDATE(a, b, c, d) \ 
XOR LAYER(b, c, d, a) \ 
ADD LAYER(a, d, c, b) \ 
SBOXLAYER(G1, d, c, b,a) \ 
SBOX_LAYER(G2, a, d, c d,) \ 
ADD LAYER( b, c, d, a) \ 
XOR LAYER(a, c, c, b) 
/* cycle the contents of the shift register */ 
#define cycle(R, rp) \ 
{ \ 
*rp = rp [N] = MULOxE382 (rp [15J) ' rp[41 A MULOx673C (*rp) ; \ 
if (++rp == &R [N]) \ 
rp = R; \ 
/* Return a non-linear function of some parts of the register. 
* The positions of the state bytes form a maximal span full 
positive 
* difference set, and are 0, 1, 6, 13, 16. 
#define nitap(R, rp) \ 
((nitap_t = *rp + rp[161), \ 
(((SBox [nitap_t >> 8] A (nitap_t & OxFF)) + rp [1] + rp [6] ) 
konst) + rp [ 13 ] ) 
i* Definition of G function*/ 
#define G1(x) \ 
sbox f x & OxFF) A  
sbox[(x >> 8) & OxFFJ 
#define G2 (x) \ 
sbox[x & OxFF] A \ 
sbox[(x >> 8) & OXFF] 
#define G3 (x) \ 
sbox[x & OxFF] A \ 
sbox[(x >> 8) & OxFF] 
#define G4 (x) \ 
sbox[x & OxFF] A \ 
sbox[(x >> 8) & OxFF] 
/* definition of function fl. the specified four arguments are 
0,4,15 and 17 where 17=0"4^15 */ 
#define bokh_nlfsr_update(R, rp)\ 
(nlfsr= *rp A rp[41 " rp [15] " \ 
bokhari_UPDATE ( *rp , rp[4] , rp [151 , (*rp  A rp[41 A rp [151 
/* load some key material into the register */ 
static void 
loadkey(unsigned char key[], int keylen) 
{ 
register WORD 	n~tap_t; 
int , 
/* start folding in key, 	odd byte first if there is one */ 
if 	((keylen & 1) != 	0) 
{ 
if 	(&rp [KEYP-NJ < 	R) 
rp [KEYP] 	+= key [0] 
else 
rp[KEYP-N] 	= rp [KEYP] 	= rp [KEYPJ 	+ key (0] 
cycle(R, 	rp); 
if 	(&rp[FOLDP-N] < 	R) 
rp[FOLDP] 	"= nitap(R, 	rp); 
else 
rp [FOLDP-N] 
} 
= rp[FOLDP] 	= rp[FOLDP] 	A nitap(R, 	rp) 
for 	(i = keylen & 1; 	i 	< 	keylen; 	i 	+= 	2) 
{ 
if 	(&rp[KEYP-N] < 	R) 
rp[KEYP] 	+= (key[i] 	<< 	8) 	+ 	key[i+1] 
else 
rp [KEYP-N] 	= rp [KEYP] 	= rp [KEYP] 	+ 	(key (i ] 	<< 	8) 	+ key 
[i+l] 
cycle(R, 	rp) ; 
if 	(&rp [FOLDP-N] < 	R) 
rp[FOLDP] 	^= nitap(R, 	rp;; 
else 
rp[FOLDP-N} = rp[FOLDP] 	= rp[FOLDP] 	A nitap(R, 	rp) 
I 
/* also fold in the length of the key */ 
if (&rp[KEYP-N) < R; 
rp [KEYP] += keylen; 
else 
rp[KEYP-N] = rp [KEYP] = rp [KEYP] + keylen; 
/* now diffuse */ 
for (i = 0; i < FOLD; ++i) 
{ 
cycle(R, rp); 
if (&rp[FOLDP-N] < R) 
rp[FOLDP] A nitap(R, rp) 
else 
rp[FOLDP-NJ = rp[FOLDP] = rp (FOLDPJ ^ nitap(R, rp) 
} 
/* calculate initial contents of the shift register */ 
void 
bokhari_key(unsigned char key[], int keylen) 
{ 
register WORD 	nitap_t; 
int i; 
/* fill the register with fibonacci numbers */ 
R[0] = Rill = 1; 
for (i = 2; i < N; i++) 
R [iJ = R (i-1] + R [i-2] ; 
/* initialise the pointers and start folding in key */ 
rp = R; 
konst = 0; 
loadkey(key, keylen); 
/* save state and key word for nonlinear function */ 
cycle(R, rp); 
konst = nitap(R, rp); 
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) 
Initial [i) = rp [i] 
/* set KONST to new value 
static void 
bok_genkonst ( ) 
{ 
WORD newkonst; // provide cycle uts arguments 
do { 
cycle(c->R); 
newkonst = nitap(c); 
} while ((newkonst & OxFF000000) == 0); 
konst = newkonst; 
/* Fold in the per-frame key */ 
void 
bokhari_seckey(unsigned char seckey[J, int seckeylength) 
{ 
register int 	i; 
/* copy initial contents */ 
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) 
R [iJ = Initial [i] 
rp = R; 
loadkey(seckey, seckeylength); 
/* XOR pseudo-random bytes into buffer */ 
#define XORWORD(p,v) (p[0] `= ((v) > 8), p[1] "= (v), p += 2) 
void 
bakhari gen(unsigned char *buf, int nbytes) 
unsigned char 	*ecdbuf; 
register WORD 	t = 0; 
register WORD 	nitap_t; 
/* assert((nbytes & 1) == 0) */ 
endbuf = &huf[nbytes]; 
while ( buf c endbuf) 
3 
cycle(R, rp); 
XOHWORD(buf, t 
} 
I.  
/* encrypt/decrypt a frame of data */ 
void 
bokhari_cenbytes(unsigned long frame, unsigned char *buf, int 
nbytes) 
unsigned char 	framebuf[4]; 
framebuf[0] _ (frame » 24) & OxFF; 
framebuf[1] _ (frame » 16) & OxFF; 
framebuf[2] _ (frame » 8) & OxFF; 
framebuf[3] _ (frame) & OxEF; 
bokhari_seckey(framebuf, 4); 
bokhari_gen(buf, nbytesi; 
#ifdet TEST 
#include cstdio.h> 
#include <szring.h> 
#include Thexlib.h" 
i* test vectors */ 
typedef unsigned char uchar; 
typedef unsigned long word32; 
uchar 	*testkey = (uchar *)°test key 128bits"; 
word32 testframe = 1L; 
ucnar testbut[20); 
WORD testkonst = 0x4b09; 
char 	*testout = 
"36 c3 df as dl 63 41 46 01 34 05 13 Bf 69 da 5e 21 45 44 
fe" 
char 	*zeros 
"00 00 00 00 30 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
00"• 
#define ITERATIONS 999999 
char 	*iterout = 
"11 31 c2 Sc d6 37 58 8f 6f bi 77 65 04 2d f4 69 47 f2 e5 
70";  
uchar bigbuf[1024*1024]; 
void 
test _bokhari(void) 
{ 
long i; 
/* test encryption */ 
bokhari_key(testkey, strlen((char *)testkey)); 
printf("%14s: %04x\n", "konst", konst); 
if (konst != testkonst) 
printf("Expected %04x, got %04x.\n", testkonst, konst); 
bokhari_genbytes(testframe, testbuf, sizeof testbuf); 
hexprint("testbuf", testbuf, sizeof testbuf); 
hexcheck(testbuf, testout, sizeof testbuf); 
/* test decryption */ 
bokhari_key(testkey, strlen((char *)testkey)); 
bokhari_genbytes(testframe, testbuf, sizeof testbuf); 
hexprint("decrypted", testbuf, sizeof testbuf); 
hexcheck(testbuf, zeros, sizeof testbuf); 
/* test iteration */ 
bokhari_key(testkey, strlen((char *)testkey)); 
bokhari_genbytes(testframe, testbuf, sizeof testbuf); 
for (i = 0; i < ITERATIONS; ++i) 
bokhari_key(testbuf, 16); 
bokhari_gen(testbuf, sizeof testbuf); 
} 
hexprint("iterated", testbuf, sizeof testbuf); 
hexcheck(testbuf, iterout, sizeof testbuf); 
void 
time _bokhari(void) 
{ 
word32 	i; 
bokhari_key(testkey, strlen((char *)testkey)); 
for (i = 0; i < 100; ++ i) 
bokhari_genbytes(i, bigbuf, sizeof bigbuf); 
} 
void 
lsb_bokhari(void) 
{ 
register inti; 
bokhari_key(testkey, 8); 
for (i = 0; i < 1024; ++i) 
cycle(R, rp); 
for (i = 0; i < 1024; ++i) 
cycle(R, rp); 
printf("%lx", (unsigned long)(*rp & 0x1)); 
} 
printf("\n"); 
} 
#ifndef KEYLOAD 
int 
main(int ac, char **av) 
{ 
int 	n; 
uchar key [ 16 ] ; 
int 	keysz; 
word32 	hook; 
if (ac == 2 && strcmp (av [1] , "-test") _= 0) { 
test _bokhari(); 
return nerrors; 
} 
if (ac == 2 && strcmp(av[1], "-time") _= 0) { 
timebokhari(); 
return 0; 
} 
if (ac == 2 && strcmp(av[1], "-lsb") _= 0) 
lsbbokhari(); 
return 0; 
} 
if (ac >= 2) 
hexread(key, av[1], keysz = strlen(av[1]) / 2); 
else 
hexread(key, "0000000000000000", keysz = 8); 
sscanf(ac >= 3 ? av[2] : "00000000", "%lx", &hook); 
sscanf(ac >= 4 ? av [3] . "10000",  "%d" , &n) 
bokhari_key(key, keysz); 
if (n > sizeof bigbuf) n = sizeof bigbuf; 
bokhari_genbytes(hook, bigbuf, n); 
hexbulk(bigbuf, n); 
return 0; 
} 
#else 
#include "stdlib.h" 
main(int ac, char. **av) { 
int 	i, j; 
int n; 
char c; 
WORD statel, state2; 
uchar 	key [ 16 ] 
sscanf(ac > 1 ? av [1. . "0 A " 	"%x%c", &n, &c) 
for (i = 0; i < 2500; ++i) 
/* random key */ 
for (j = 0; j < sizeof key; ++j) 
key[j] = random ( ) & OxFF; 
bokhari_key(key, sizeof key); 
bokhari_seckey("\0\0\0\0", 4); 
statel = R[(r+n)%N]; 
bokhariseckey("\0\0\0\1", 4); 
state2 = R [ (r+n) %N] 
printf("Ox%04x\n", 
c == 1^1 ? 
statel A  state2 
(statel - state2) & OxFFFF); 
} 
#endif 
#endif 
